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Governing by Executive Order During the 
Covid-19 Pandemic: Preliminary 
Observations Concerning the Proper 
Balance Between Executive Orders and 
More Formal Rule Making 
Kelly J. Deere* 
ABSTRACT 
As the United States entered 2021, almost all fifty states were still operating 
under a state of emergency due to COVID-19 more than nine months later.  
Governors using emergency powers provided to them under their respective 
emergency disaster statutes and state constitutions continued to govern their 
state by executive order.  These executive orders have had significant impacts on 
citizens’ everyday lives including stay-at-home orders, limits on non-essential 
gatherings, non-essential business closures and moratoriums on evictions.  And 
these emergency orders have been opposed at almost every turn from citizens 
gathering in public protest shouting “Liberate Michigan,” to constitutional legal 
challenges to these orders.  Even with three promising vaccines receiving 
emergency authorization at the time of this article’s submission, it will be months 
or longer before life returns to normal.  Therefore, it becomes incumbent to ask 
the question whether governors should continue to wield this emergency power 
 
*Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law.  I would like 
to thank George Morton for his thorough research on many aspects of this piece.  I am 
grateful to Beth Stephens and Robert Williams for their honest assessment, mentorship 
and comments throughout the writing of this article.  A special thanks to Amy Widman 
for her support and advice.  Andrew Hoy provided invaluable help in getting this 
article ready for submission.  And thank you to the Missouri Law Review editors for 
their keen observations, thoughtful comments and valuable edits.  This work was made 
possible from the generous support of the Rutgers Law School Endowment for Faculty 
Research. 
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or whether state legislatures and/or state agencies should take on more 
responsibility.  In answer to this question, this article concludes that governors 
should use executive orders in some measure as long as COVID-19 is being 
transmitted in their communities but not for all areas.  Since COVID-19 is a 
highly contagious disease and is difficult to contain, governors need to be able 
to quickly and nimbly issue orders to curb transmission as long as there is a 
reasonable check on their power to do so.  However, state legislatures and/or 
state agencies should enact emergency statutes or regulations following the 
more formal rule making process in areas that do not require immediate action 
such as requiring facial coverings in public spaces.  This article draws its 
conclusion by examining three key areas.  First, most governors have a 
meaningful check on their emergency powers from both the judiciary and the 
state legislature.  Second, governors and litigants can learn from prior cases to 
ensure executive orders do not single out a group or unnecessarily burden 
another.  Third, since some states have had success in enacting emergency 
regulations, statutes or guidelines concerning COVID-19, more states should 
follow suit. 
2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Between March 2020 and June 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen 
Whitmer issued more than 130 executive orders concerning the COVID-
19 pandemic.1  Colorado Governor Jared Polis issued about 115 executive 
orders and New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy issued over fifty in the same 
span.2  Even those state governors that used executive orders more 
sparingly still issued a fair number with the Idaho Governor signing twenty 
executive orders and Missouri Governor signing fifteen.3  These executive 
orders significantly affected citizens’ everyday lives including requiring 
its citizens to stay-at-home, limiting gathering sizes and mandating the 
wearing of facial coverings in public spaces.4  Many of these executive 
orders required non-essential businesses to shut their physical locations.5 
With most Americans at home and many out of work, governors or state 
public health officials issued executive orders with wide-ranging 
economic consequences such as placing a moratorium on evictions and 
banning a shut-off of utilities.6  Some citizens, businesses and even some 
state legislatures did not simply accept these orders, but rather gathered in 
protest or legally challenged the orders as violating their constitutional 
rights.7  But unlike most other emergencies in recent memory such as 
hurricanes, wildfires or even 9/11, COVID-19’s reach goes beyond a city, 
county, state or even region.  COVID-19 is not simply an American 
problem but has found its way to all corners of the globe.8  In late fall of 
2020, the pandemic virtually exploded with cases rising practically 
everywhere across the United States.9  And with COVID-19 stretching into 
2021 and beyond, governors continue to issue executive orders concerning 
the pandemic as the disease has evolved and more highly transmissible 
variants threaten to undermine vaccination efforts.10  Indeed, as of May 1, 
 












9 Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/92YS-785B] (last visited Dec. 30, 2020). 
10 See generally infra Part II and Part IV. 
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2021, forty-seven states still had an active state of emergency for COVID-
19.11 
Emergency executive orders do not go through the same rulemaking 
process as a statute passed by the legislature or even a state regulation that 
is required to go through the state’s administrative procedure act.12  Over 
more than a year into the pandemic, most governors had largely used 
executive orders to curb transmission as well as take aggressive economic 
action over the past year.13  But should they?  And if so to what extent?   
Part I of this article examines the nature of state executive orders and 
how they are used in emergency situations.  As shown through Appendix 
A, the article examines the various state emergency disaster statutes and 
the types of legislative limits on governors’ powers.  Part II provides 
background of the COVID-19 pandemic and how executive orders have 
played a defining role during this time.  In Part III, the article reviews the 
litigation landscape surrounding emergency executive orders during the 
pandemic.  Specifically, the article looks at recent civil rights challenges 
to certain types of executive orders. The article also reviews challenges by 
government officials such as the state legislature or governor concerning 
the statutory process for declaring an emergency or the constitutional 
validity of the statute itself.  In Part IV, the article surveys four states’ 
approach to the pandemic through 2020.  And finally, Part V evaluates 
whether governors should use emergency executive orders where the 
pandemic is likely to go on for longer than a year.  This article argues that 
governors should be able to quickly respond in some measure as long as 
COVID-19 is being transmitted in the communities but not for all areas.  
For those areas where there is a long-term ongoing response to COVID-
19, the state legislature should pass an emergency or temporary statute, or 
a state agency should promulgate regulations to address a particular 
concern.  Likewise, the state legislature may need to step in when the 
governor is not doing enough. 
 
 11 Each States COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask 
Requirements, NAT’L ACADEMY FOR STATE & HEALTH POLICY, (April 19, 2021) 
https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritize-health-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/W2LE-
NT5H] [hereinafter COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans]. 
12 See Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
987, 989–90 (1999). 
13 See COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans, supra note 11.  As of May 1, 
2021, only Alaska, Wisconsin and Michigan did not have a current COVID-19 state 
of emergency.  Id. 
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II. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND STATE EMERGENCY DISASTER 
STATUTES 
In most every state constitution, the governor is vested with the chief 
executive power of the state and is commander in chief.14  While in the 
early 20th century the office was viewed as weak, governors today garner 
greater powers and their responsibilities and duties have significantly 
increased.15  For example, governors have “longer terms in office, 
increased veto power, and stronger budgetary authority.”16  During non-
emergency times, governors are responsible for executing the state laws 
and managing the state executive branch.17 One of the governor’s most 
important duties is to submit an annual budget for review and approval by 
the state legislature.18  Governors also have the power to appoint executive 
officers in the state agencies and in their cabinet.19  And, as an important 
check on the legislative branch, all fifty state governors have the power to 
veto “whole legislative measures.”20  In a state of emergency, most 
governors have much broader powers.21 They exercise these powers 
through emergency executive orders in order to prepare and respond to 
disasters of all sizes and shapes.22 
 
14 Governor’s Power and Authority, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, 
https://www.nga.org/governors/powers-and-authority/ [https://perma.cc/8LQC-
YAAQ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
15 See Ann O’M. Bowman & James H. McKenzie, Managing a Pandemic at 
Less Than Global Scale: Governors Take the Lead, 50 AM. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 551, 
551 (2020); Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV.  484, 
493 (2017) (arguing that the modern governor “originally created to be powerless 
figureheads have emerged as the drivers of state government”).  For example, the New 
Jersey Constitution in 1776 gave little power to the governor and did not even provide 
for a separate executive branch.  The New Jersey Governor was elected by the upper 
branch of the state legislature.  Herman, supra note 12, at 988. 
16 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 303 
(2009); Seifter, supra note 15, at 499–515 (outlining a governor’s set of six tools to 
control agency action which include directives, centralized regulatory review, 
reorganization, line-item veto power, privatization and removal of state agency 
heads). 




21 See generally infra Part I.C. 
22 Governor’s Power and Authority, supra note 14. 
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A gubernatorial executive order is a rule or order issued by the 
governor.23  An executive order is usually comprised of three sections.24  
The first section, also known as the “whereas” section, contains the 
purpose of the order.25  In this section, the governor articulates the reasons 
for the order and what she hopes to accomplish by it.26  The second section 
contains the authority for issuing the order either from the state 
constitution or by state statute.27  And finally, the third section comprises 
the substance of the actual order.28  An executive order may be issued 
immediately and does not need to go through the same formal rule making 
process as a bill passed by the legislature or a regulation promulgated by 
a state agency.29  
Some state constitutions give their governors significant power 
during an emergency while others are essentially silent.30  All fifty state 
constitutions give their governor power to call for a special session of the 
legislature.31  Still, most governors rely on  emergency powers granted to 
them by their state legislature through some type of emergency disaster 
statute.32  This statutory framework grants to the governor (or in some 
cases a state health official) the authority to declare a state of emergency 
 
23 See Friends of Danny Devito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 892 (Pa. 2020).  These 
executive orders can be broken down into three areas: 1) ceremonial proclamations; 
2) directives to subordinate executive officials for execution of their particular duties; 
and 3) interpretation or implementation of statutory or other law. See Herman, supra 
note 12, at 994. 
24 Herman, supra note 12, at 992. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 992–93. 
28 Id. at 994. 
29 Id. 
30 For example, both the Louisiana and Oregon state constitutions give their 
governors broad powers.  See LA. CONST. art. IV., § 5 (giving the Governor the power 
“to preserve law and order, to suppress insurrection . . . .”); OR. CONST. art. X-A, § 2 
(providing for the governor to “manage the immediate response of the disaster.”).  In 
contrast, in Idaho and South Carolina those powers come only from state statute.  See 
HEATHER PERKINS, THE BOOK OF STATES (Council of State Gov’ts 2019), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2019-chapter-4-state-
executive-branch [https://perma.cc/F3YF-QC35]; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Public Health Emergencies and State Constitutional Quality, 72 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1223, 1224 (2020) (offering a “thought experiment . . . at how we might redesign state 
constitutions to enable government to respond most effectively to [public health] 
emergencies.”). 
31 Special Sessions, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (March 9, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/special-sessions472.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YBT9-ACBS]. 
32 See Appendix A.  I use the term state emergency disaster statute to generally 
refer to the statutory scheme by which the governor can declare a state of emergency 
and trigger accompanying powers. 
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and to issue executive orders to prepare, prevent, respond and recover in 
connection with the emergency.33  Most of these emergency disaster 
statutes were enacted post World War II with many of them passed in the 
1970’s.34  One reason for granting governors such broad powers under 
these statutes is clear: some state legislatures meet “infrequently and often 
for only a few months each year.”35  For example, in March 2020, the New 
York State Legislature amended the Executive Law to give its Governor 
additional powers to “issue directives when a state disaster emergency is 
declared.” It did so because these “changes ensure that the Governor has 
legal authority to confront these emergencies.”36  When a governor 
declares a state of emergency, he will likely need to state the nature of the 
emergency, define the specific regions or geographic areas subject to the 
declaration, the conditions which brought about the emergency, the 
duration of the emergency, and the authorities responding to it.37   
Under many of these emergency disaster statutes, governors have the 
authority to issue executive orders in response to a natural disaster - 
including a pandemic.38  These orders are enacted swiftly with little 
warning or notice, much like the emergency these orders seek to address.39  
Once the emergency is declared, the governor may issue orders 
immediately.40  For most states, their governor’s powers under a state of 
emergency are broad, giving her the authority to suspend or amend any 
regulatory statute.41 Most of these emergency disaster statutes provide the 
governor with the power to garner resources to address the emergency, 
 
33 Id. 
34 See generally, PATRICK S. ROBERTS, DISASTERS AND THE AMERICAN STATE 
127–45 (2013). 
35 Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 241 
(2006). 
36 Ethan Geringer-Sameth, The State Legislature in a State of Emergency, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE, (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.gothamgazette.com/state/9231-
new-york-state-legislature-cuomo-state-of-emergency-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/8M7T-4H2S]; see also S.B. 7919, 2020 Leg. (N.Y. 2020). 
37 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-131a(b)(1) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
30.403(3) (2020); 35 PA. CON. STAT. § 7301(c) (2020). 
38 See Friends of Danny Devito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 888 (Pa. 2020) (finding 
that while the PA Emergency Code does not include the word pandemic in its list of 
catastrophes, it is included as a natural disaster). 
39 Bowman & McKenzie, supra note 15, at 553. 
40 See Friends of Danny Devito, 227 A.3d at 890. 
41 For example, during Hurricane Katrina Governor Blanco in one executive 
order suspended the laws, rules and regulations concerning medical professionals in 
order to allow out of state medical personnel to provide immediate care to Louisiana 
citizens.  La. Exec. Order No. KBB 05-33 (Sept. 12, 2005), 
https://www.doa.la.gov/media/ci5lwdfy/0509.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MJ2-MT9Z]. 
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assemble the national guard, order evacuations and seize property.42  Some 
governors have the power to issue orders for the protection of the health, 
safety and welfare of its people.43  However, governors do not appear to 
have the authority to exempt constitutional state requirements during an 
emergency.44   
Under an emergency declaration, executive orders give the governor 
the ability to adapt to an ever-changing situation.45  As more information 
becomes known about an emergency, the governor can modify, amend or 
even rescind an executive order as quickly as she issued one in the first 
place.46  For example, on August 3, 2020, New Jersey Governor Phil 
Murphy issued Executive Order 173, which decreased indoor gatherings 
from 100 persons to twenty-five persons because many recent infections 
were the result of larger house party gatherings.47  In doing so, Governor 
Murphy rescinded paragraph one of Executive Order 156 issued six weeks 
earlier which allowed for larger gatherings.48 
Most state emergency statutes define emergency quite broadly.49  
Most typically, governors have declared a state of emergency in the wake 
 
42 See Maggie Davis et. al., 12 CONLAWNOW 95 (2020); see, e.g., COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-33.5-704 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 401.68, 401.75 (2020). 
43 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-15-11(c)(4) (2020) (“To perform and exercise 
such other functions, powers and duties as may be necessary to promote and secure 
the safety and protection of the civilian population in coping with a disaster or 
emergency.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100 1(3)(j) (2020) (“Perform and exercise such 
other functions, powers and duties as may be necessary to promote and secure the 
safety and protection of the civilian population.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 683.9.5 
(2020) (“To perform and exercise such other functions, powers, and duties as are 
necessary to promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian population . 
. . .”). 
44 See Ritchie v. Polis, 467 P.3d 339, 345 (Colo. 2020) (holding that Governor 
does not have authority under Colorado Disaster Emergency Act to suspend signature 
requirement on ballot initiative petitions since it is a constitutional requirement). 
45 Governor’s Power and Authority, supra note 14. 
46 Id. 
47 N.J. Exec. Order No. 173 (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eocc173.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWC7-DV64]. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (2020) (defining natural disaster in the 
Emergency Code as “[a]ny hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven 
water, tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, 
explosion or other catastrophe which results in substantial damage to property, 
hardship, suffering or possible loss of life”); OR. REV. STAT. § 401.025 (2020) 
(defining emergency as “[f]ire, explosion, flood, severe weather, landslides or mud 
slides, drought, earthquake, volcanic activity, tsunamis or other oceanic phenomena, 
spills or releases of oil or hazardous material as defined in ORS 466.605, 
contamination, utility or transportation emergencies, disease, blight, infestation, civil 
disturbance, riot, sabotage, acts of terrorism and war”). 
9
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of a natural disaster such as a hurricane or a tornado.50  Recently, state 
governors in the western part of the United States declared a state of 
emergency due to uncontrolled wildfires in the area.51  On the national 
security front, New York and New Jersey’s governors declared a state of 
emergency in 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11.52  
State governors do not respond to emergencies in a vacuum.  The federal 
government takes on a role, but its role is usually secondary to state and 
local governments.53  Under the Stafford Act, the U.S. president can 
declare a federal emergency, but any federal resources are considered to 
supplement state and local resources.54  Therefore, the governor’s role 
during an emergency is of prime importance.   
During an emergency, state legislatures typically do not play a 
significant role in recovery efforts.55 This article argues that state 
legislatures should assume a more comprehensive role during a state of 
emergency 56  Most state legislatures serve two purposes in an emergency: 
(1) serving as a check on gubernatorial powers; and (2) providing funds 
aimed at directly addressing a state of emergency.57  Yet, state legislatures 
are not precluded from enacting legislation addressing an emergency and 
some certainly do even during this pandemic.58  It would just need the time 
to do so.  Each state legislature has a formal rule making process which 
often requires multiple steps from a bill’s initial introduction to its final 
 
50 See, e.g., La. Proclamation No. 133 JBE 2020 (Oct. 6, 2020), 
https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/Proclamations/2020/133-JBE-2020-SOE-Hurricane-
Delta.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGN-HYZG] (declaring a state of emergency concerning 
hurricane delta). 
51 See Or. Exec. Order No. 20-35, (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/executive_orders/eo_20-35.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JYU6-8ZPA]; Wash. Exec. Order No. 20-68, (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-
68%20Wildfires%20%28tmp%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF4B-FYRE]. 
52 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 9, § 5.113 (Sept. 11, 2001); N.J. Exec. 
Order No. 131 (Sept. 11, 2011), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-
131.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TRY-BNFJ]. 
53 Rossi, supra note 35, at 924. 
54 Id. 
55 See Thom Little, Who’s in Charge Here? Checks and Balances During a State 
of Emergency, STATE LEGIS. LEADERS FOUND. (May 20, 2020), 
https://www.sllf.org/whos-in-charge-here-checks-and-balances-during-a-state-of-
emergency/ [https://perma.cc/8K46-NPL2]. 
56 This article argues, in part, that state legislatures should do more in areas less 
emergent.  See infra Part V.C. 
57 See Eric Daleo, State Constitution and Legislative Continuity in a 9/11 World: 
Surviving and “Enemy Attack,” 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 919, 924–25 (2009) (explaining 
that state legislatures still “have a defined role in budgeting, lawmaking, and 
‘checking’ the executive branch in the system of checks and balances.”). 
58 See generally infra Part IV.A., C. 
10
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passage.59  At a minimum, this process can take days, but it often takes 
weeks, months or even a year.60  Moreover, about forty states have part-
time legislatures with some state legislatures meeting for only a few 
months out of the year.61  
A. Public Health Emergencies 
While all fifty states have some type of emergency disaster statute, 
some state legislatures have included a separate public health emergency 
component to its disaster statute or passed separate public health 
emergency legislation.62  This came about after the terrorist attacks in 2001 
and the subsequent anthrax attack, where there were federal and state level 
efforts to strengthen the public health infrastructure.63  In 2003, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) commissioned public health 
law experts at John Hopkins and Georgetown Universities to draft what is 
called the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA”).64  
The MSEPHA is a comprehensive model act designed for state legislature 
contemplation to provide state actors with powers “to detect and contain a 
potentially catastrophic disease outbreak… .”65  The MSEPHA provides 
detailed sections on the mechanisms for declaring a public health state of 
emergency as well as those special powers that accompany such a 
declaration.66   
While criticized for failing to provide enough individual protections, 
a large number of states adopted some parts of the MSEPHA into 
 
59 See, e.g., The Path of Legislation in New Jersey, N.J. STATE HOUSE TOURS, 
https://njstatehousetours.org/tour/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/2017Insidepage_LegProcside2.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ26-
X9WG] (last visited July 21, 2021). 
60 See, e.g., id. Additionally, the Michigan legislature acted quickly to enact 
legislation for some of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders that will no longer valid.  
Even on a time sensitive basis, these six bills took between two and three weeks to 
pass.  See H.B. 6137, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Mich. 2020), H.B. 6293, 100th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); H.B. 2694, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Mich. 2020). 
61 Full- and Part-time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-
legislatures.aspx#side_by_side [https://perma.cc/H8F4-R5LG]. 
62 Lainie Rutkow, An Analysis of State Public Health Emergency Declarations, 
104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1601 (Sept. 2014). 
63 Lawrence Gostin, The Model State Emergency Act: Public Health and Civil 
Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3 (2013). 
64 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/text-msehpa [https://perma.cc/U4Z9-LL7M] (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2021) [hereinafter MSEHPA]. 
65 Gostin, supra note 63, at 5. 
66 See generally MSEPHA supra note 64. 
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restructuring their own public health emergency response.67  In all, twenty-
four states have incorporated a specific declaration of a state public health 
emergency with some accompanying public health emergency powers in 
their laws.68  For states declaring a public health emergency, this triggers 
a certain specific set of emergency powers.69   
Public health legal scholar Lindsay Wiley argues that the MSEPHA 
was not designed with the current COVID-19 pandemic in mind.70  Wiley 
explains “the MSEPHA and the initial legislation it inspired focused 
predominantly on individually targeted measures to achieve containment 
– stopping the spread of infection from initial cases (typically transmitted 
from international travelers) to other people before community 
transmission becomes widespread primarily through screening, isolation 
and quarantine of individuals.”71  The drafters of the MSEPHA did not 
likely contemplate a contagion such as COVID-19, which spreads in pre-
symptomatic individuals and to some extent asymptomatic individuals 
often without detection72  And as a result, the MSEPHA and the state 
statutes modeled in part after it failed to incorporate community mitigation 
efforts such as the wearing of facial coverings and other social distancing 
measures.73 
For those states having a public health emergency statute, the 
governor is not necessarily precluded from using the more general 
 
67 In 2003, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted or were 
expected to enact some version of the MSEPHA. Gostin, supra note 63, at 5.  
Criticisms of the MSEPHA abounded in the civil rights context.  In particular, the 
ACLU criticized the MSEPHA as being “replete with civil liberties problems” 
including insufficient checks and balances on state executives among other concerns.  
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Q&A on the Model State Emergency 
Powers Act, AMER. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/print/node/24150 
[https://perma.cc/BY6P-4F84] (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). 
68 Rutkow, supra note 62.  In 2003, thirty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia enacted or were expected to enact some version of the MSEPHA. Gostin, 
supra note 63, at 5. 
69 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-3 (West 2020) (providing powers to the 
health commissioner to respond to public health emergency); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-
10A-6 (2020) (authorizing secretary of health and secretary of public safety special 
powers during public health emergency such as utilizing health care facilities for 
public use and rationing health care supplies). 
70 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE 
J. OF HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 50, 64 (2020). 
71 Id. at 64. 
72 Mark K. Slivka, Is Presymptomatic Spread a Major Contributor to COVID-
19 Transmission?, 26 NATURE MED. 1531, 1531–33 (Aug. 17, 2020) (reviewing 
several COVID-19 case studies found multiple instances of transmission prior to 
symptom onset though it is difficult to quantify), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-1046-6#citeas [https://perma.cc/XP2B-
KKZ3]. 
73 Wiley, supra note 70, at 66. 
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emergency disaster statute for her state.74  In fact, at least five governors 
declared a public health emergency along with a broader state of 
emergency or disaster for COVID-19, and at least one governor issued a 
general state of emergency instead of a more specific public health 
emergency.75   
B. Key Components of State Emergency Disaster Statutes 
During the height of the pandemic in 2020, many state emergency 
disaster statutes provided that the state of emergency declaration last for a 
short duration such as fifteen, thirty, forty-five, or sixty days and one for 
six months.76  Indeed, the vast majority of state emergency disaster statutes 
employ some type of durational limitation.77  If the emergency persists, 
the governors in a few states may renew the declaration.78  However, in 
seven states only the legislature may renew by concurrent resolution.79  For 
 
74 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 90. 
75 Florida, Maryland, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming declared both public 
health emergencies and general state of emergencies.  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 20–
51 (March 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-
51.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7HM-RVER] (ordering state health officer to declare public 
health emergency); Md. Proclamation (March 5, 2020), 
https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Proclamation-COVID-
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7FS-DKGL] (declaring state of emergency and existence of 
catastrophic health emergency); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-12 (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/1927.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYV4-
CRXJ] (declaring public health emergency); Utah State Pub. Health Order No. 2020-
17 (Oct. 14, 2020), https://coronavirus-download.utah.gov/Health/UPHO-2020-17-
Public-Health-Emergency-Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/A27L-V45A] (declaring 
public health emergency); Utah Exec. Order 2020-63 (Sept. 19, 2020), 
https://rules.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Utah-Executive-Order-No.-2020-63.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WR4B-R4GH] (declaring state of emergency; Wy. Exec. Order 
2020-2 (March 13, 2020), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/19mX3feCje2NKRrKi_GPiKvwcckGVoVBh/view 
[https://perma.cc/4YZR-QHT4] (declaring state of emergency and public health 
emergency); Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown, 466 P.3d 30, 46 (Or. 2020) 
(recognizing that the Oregon Public Health emergency statute provided the governor 
with an option short of declaring a state of disaster but holding that she was not 
required to take that route). 
76 See Appendix A. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. The emergency disaster statutes for Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and 
New York specifically provide for the governor to renew or extend the emergency.  
Most other state emergency disaster statutes are silent on the point. Id. 
79 Id. Those seven states or U.S. territories are Alaska, Kansas, Michigan, South 
Carolina, U.S. Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Alabama provides that 
either the governor or legislature may extend. Id.  Oklahoma provides that the 
legislature must approve the initial public health emergency. Id.  As discussed more 
fully in infra Part III.B and Part IV, Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin have all had 
13
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a number of states, the emergency declaration stays in place until 
rescinded or amended.80  A majority of state emergency statutes provide 
the state legislature with authority to terminate an emergency declaration, 
usually by concurrent resolution.81 The New York COVID-19 emergency 
disaster statute appears to be by itself in providing the legislature with 
additional authority to terminate emergency executive orders by 
concurrent resolution.82  For state emergency disaster statutes that do not 
provide the state legislature with any specific authority to extend or 
terminate emergency declarations, the legislature always has the option to 
amend or repeal the statute.83   
State declarations of emergency often do not go beyond the initial 
declaration lasting typically just days, weeks or sometimes months.84 
However, while uncommon, some emergencies last significantly longer.  
For example, a number of states had declared a state of emergency in 
response to the Opioid crisis with some of these emergency declarations 
lasting several years.85  And the New Jersey Supreme Court finally held 
that after “almost twelve years, prison overcrowding was no longer an 
‘emergency’ under the Disaster Control Act.”86   
 
hotly contested litigation between the governor and legislature stemming from the 
legislature’s sole authority to renew the state of emergency. 
80 Id. The states that do not have a specified durational limitation are Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Vermont, 
Virginia, and West Virginia.  Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See N.Y. Exec. Law § 20-A(4) (LexisNexis effective Mar. 7, 2020 until Apr. 
29, 2021). The statute was repealed about two months before it was to expire.  See 
S.B. 5357, 2021-2022 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021). 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Tenn. Exec. Order No. 7 (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-lee7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L479-8LVN].  For example, on March 7, 2019, Tennessee Governor 
Bill Lee issued Executive Order No. 7 declaring a state of emergency in response to 
severe storms, flooding and wind.   Id.  That executive order lasted for 30 days.  Id. 
85 Jeffrey Locke, et. al., The Role of State Emergency Powers in Curbing the 
Opioid Epidemic: A Case Study in Lessons Learned, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 646–53 
(2019).  The authors found that Massachusetts and South Carolina Governors issued 
state of emergencies concerning the Opioid crisis in 2017 and that those emergency 
declarations were still in effect as of the date of the article’s submission in 2019. 
86 Herman, supra note 12, at 101 (citing County of Gloucester v. State, 623 A.2d 
763, 767 (1993)). 
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C. Ongoing Debate About Executive’s Emergency Powers  
At the national level, legal scholars disagree about the extent of an 
executive’s power during times of crisis.87  Some argue that in a time of 
crisis both the judicial and legislative branches will delegate significant 
powers to the executive.88  These scholars believe that the executive, 
armed with the information and the ability to quickly act, is the only 
branch that can aptly respond to a crisis.89  This argument stems from the 
classic Carl Schmitt view of executive authority which finds that even if 
the law attempts “to constrain the powers of government, during a time of 
crisis, there is always someone who must decide to invoke the state of 
exception as a discretionary matter.”90  This view argues that deference 
from both the judicial and legislative branches is key for the executive’s 
ability to respond in an emergency.91   
Others also argue for a strong executive during a time of emergency 
but find that the executive should be bound by checks and balances.92  
While scholars here recognize that the judiciary and legislature may afford 
some degree of deference to the executive during an emergency, they find 
that both of these branches should still play an important role in 
“constraining national executives.”93  They also argue that the type of 
emergency may affect the degree of deference the judiciary and legislature 
afford executives.94  For a national security emergency, courts and 
legislatures may give the executive a great degree of deference where there 
 
87 See Daniel Farber, The Long Shadow of Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Public 
Health, Fundamental Rights, and the Courts, at 834 n. 10 (July 7, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3635740 
[https://perma.cc/894G-2AKZ]; Rossi, supra note 35, at 261 n.5 (defining “crisis” as 
the “triggering event” and “emergency” as “the legal status for the assertion of 
executive powers”). 
88 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 35, at 240. 
89 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15–16 (2007).  Posner and Vermeule find that the judiciary 
and legislative branches are not quick to respond in an emergency. Id. 
90 Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers 
During the Pandemic 8 (Va. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch Paper No. 2020-52, Univ. 
of Chicago, Pub. L. Working Paper No. 747, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608974 
[https://perma.cc/5CCF-JYHH]. 
91 Id.; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating 
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 609 (2003). These scholars recognize that a high 
degree of deference particularly from the judiciary may lead to executive abuse 
whereby an executive may be able to hold onto power and squash any legal opponents. 
Id. 
92 Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 90, at 8. 
93 Id. at 1. 
94 Id. at 19–20. 
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is a need for secrecy, whereas a pandemic emergency requires a broad set 
of participants such as those from local government, drug companies and 
hospitals.95  Some argue  in the context of a pandemic, courts and 
legislatures may see themselves as helping in the response rather than 
being in the way.96  Similarly, executives have used their emergency 
powers to respond to natural disasters and other health crises that last a 
short time and both the judiciary and legislature may often step aside to 
allow a quick response.97  Those emergencies differ significantly from that 
of a pandemic or other prolonged public health crisis.98  
At the state level prior to the pandemic, scholarship was sparse about 
how broad the governor’s powers should be during a state of emergency.99  
Clearly, the scholarship is emerging.  But the different theories concerning 
emergency powers of national executives could apply equally as well at 
the state or sub-national level.100 As discussed more in infra Part V, 
governors require broad emergency powers during the COVID-19 
pandemic in order to curb the transmission of the virus.  However, these 
emergency powers should also be subject to some degree of judicial and 
legislative oversight, so a governor does not overstep her bounds. Judicial 
and legislative oversight should not amount to active participation in what 
is considered an executive function during a crisis.101  
III. IMPACT AND RESPONSE TO COVID-19 IN THE UNITED STATES 
With a federalist system, the United States’ response to the pandemic 
has been fraught with problems, inconsistencies and occasional successes. 
To better understand the role of governors, state legislatures and state 
agencies in this ongoing crisis, this section provides background on 
COVID-19 and how it first arrived in the United States.  Next it looks at 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 20. 
97 See Appendix A.  Indeed, more than thirty state emergency disaster or public 
health emergency statutes limit the initial declaration of emergency to thirty or sixty 
days. 
98 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 85, at 637. 
99 Professor Rossi argues that there should be a presumption of state executive 
power during times of crisis. Rossi, supra note 35, at 238–39. Rossi says that the “lack 
of clarity” concerning the governor’s role in a crisis affects the governor’s ability to 
properly respond. Id at 276; see generally Seifter, supra note 15 (providing a general 
overview of the modern gubernatorial regime). 
100 Rossi, supra note 35, at 273–74.  Rossi cites to the scholarship surrounding 
the argument for a strong federal executive during times of crisis.  Id.  He argues that 
the “case for a strong executive at the state level is stronger” than at the national level 
since civil right remedies are more likely to be in conflict at the national level. Id. 
101 See Rossi, supra note 35, at 268. 
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how governors initially responded to the pandemic.  And finally, this 
section describes the impact the pandemic has had on the economy.  
A. COVID-19 in the United States 
In March 2020, COVID-19, a respiratory disease caused by the newly 
discovered Coronavirus, shut down much of the United States.102  While 
Washington state officially had the first COVID-19 case in January, 
California was the first state to declare an emergency due to the virus.103  
By March 17, 2020, forty-eight states had declared emergencies due to 
COVID-19.104  And by April 7, 2020, forty-two state governors plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had ordered their people to shelter 
in place.105  From there, many state governors issued a plethora of 
executive orders in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.106   
In the beginning, COVID-19 was a bit of a mystery, but the CDC 
indicated that the virus was highly contagious.107  The virus is transmitted 
through person to person contact such as touching or shaking hands of an 
infected individual, inhaling airborne particles of the virus left by an 
infected individual, or coming into contact with the respiratory droplets of 
an infected individual.108 The virus can have a long incubation period 
whereby an individual may not show symptoms for up to 14 days.109  And 
 
102 See generally Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/E6EL-
XSSZ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2021). 
103 Cal. Exec. Order No. N-33-20 (March 19, 2020), 
https://covid19.ca.gov/img/Executive-Order-N-33-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GFW-
GYS4] (On March 4, 2020 California declared a state of emergency.). 
104 Rosie Perper et al., Almost all US States have declared states of emergency 
to fight coronavirus – here’s what it means for them, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/california-washington-state-of-emergency-
coronavirus-what-it-means-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/YVF8-UMK9]. 
105 Sarah Mervosh et al., See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to 




107 Steven Sanche et. al., High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, 26 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1470, 
1471 (2020). 
108 COVID-19 Overview and Infection Prevention and Control Priorities in non-
US Health Care Settings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/non-us-
settings/overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XDX-PAB6] (last visited Aug. 12, 
2020). The CDC says that there is insufficient evidence supporting long range aerosol 
transmission of COVID-19 but that short-range transmission of the virus via aerosol 
is a possibility. Id. 
109 Id. 
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a significant number of those infected may not show symptoms and 
otherwise be asymptomatic.110 This aspect of the disease has made the 
traditional method of containment difficult at best.111   
B. Initial Governors’ Response to the Pandemic 
To curb the spread of the virus, mitigation measures were put in place 
to reduce person to person contact.112  That meant keeping socially distant 
from one another.113  For most states, the governors issued shelter in place 
orders requiring its residents to stay at home other than attending to basic 
needs such as going to the grocery store, pharmacy or getting some 
exercise.114  For the most part, only essential workers were out and about 
during the stay-at-home orders.115  Beginning as early as April 20, 2020, 
states slowly reopened their economies.116  In April 2020, the CDC along 
with the White House issued guidelines for “Opening Up America 
Again.”117  As of the date of this article, all fifty states had reopened their 
economies to some extent.118  Even though states began reopening their 
economies, restrictions still abounded.119 A number of states, for example, 
still limited sizes of mass gatherings, placed restrictions on indoor dining, 
restricted capacity at fitness centers and bars, as well as kept public schools 
closed.120  Many states also had different regions of their state move more 
 
110 Id. 
111 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 69–71 (recounting early parts of pandemic where 
traditional methods of isolation, quarantine and containment failed to reduce 
community transmission of COVID-19); Monica Gandhi et. al. Asymptomatic 
Transmission: the Achilles’ Heel of Current Strategies to Control Covid-19l, 382 NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED. 2158 (2020). 
112 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 72-73. 
113 Id. 
114 See Mervosh, supra note 105. 
115 See Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure 
Workers During COVID-19 Response, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. 
AGENCY (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA-
Guidance-on-Essential-Critical-Infrastructure-Workers-1-20-508c.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7YZH-B6RU]. 
116 See Jasmine C. Lee et. al., See Reopening Plans and Mask Mandates for All 
50 States, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-
map-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/8AGK-VG46] (last visited Aug. 4, 2020). 
117 Guidelines: Opening Up America Again, WHITE HOUSE & CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/openingamerica/ [https://perma.cc/8T5V-3FAV] 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2021). 
118 Id. 
119 Lee, supra note 116. 
120 Id. 
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quickly into reopening phases than others.121  For a vocal minority, the 
states’ reopening plans did not move quickly enough.122  For example, in 
April 2020, protestors converged on state capitols in Michigan and 
Minnesota chanting “liberate Michigan” and “liberate Minnesota.”123 
Those protectors echoed President Trump’s tweets rebuking the Michigan 
and Minnesota democratic governors who had issued social distancing 
restrictions.124 Yet in 2020 the majority of Americans largely approved of 
these social distancing measures.125   
As states began to reopen their economies, many governors issued 
state-wide mask mandates.126  Connecticut was the first state to issue a 
statewide face mask requirement in early April 2020.127  As of early 
November 2020, only thirty-three states had a statewide mask mandate 
with many of the state governors having issued the mandate in the late 
spring and summer of 2020.128  One state, Mississippi, lifted its mask order 
on September 30, 2020.129  While the CDC had sent mixed messaging in 
the beginning, the scientific evidence is clear that facial coverings protect 
 
121 Reopening New York: Implementing CDC Guidance, N.Y. STATE, 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
05/NYS_CDCGuidance_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7WR-AF7L] (last visited 
June 7, 2020). 
122 See Lee, supra note 116. 
123 Id. 
124 Michael D. Shear & Sarah Mervosh, Trump Encourages Protests Against 
Governors Who Have Imposed Virus Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-governors.html 
[https://perma.cc/ST64-3Y4A]. 
125 Andrew Daniller, Americans Remain Concerned that States Will Lift 




126 See State-Level Mask Requirements in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-
19) Pandemic 2020-2021, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State-
level_mask_requirements_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-
19)_pandemic,_2020-2021 [https://perma.cc/R2KW-7NWP] (last visited July 21, 
2021). 
127 Lindsay K. Cloud et. al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, 
and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 
(Scott Burris et al. ed. August 2020). 
128 Andy Markowitz, State-by-State Guide to Face Mask Requirements, AM. 
ASSN. RETIRED PERS. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-
living/info-2020/states-mask-mandates-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/NKB9-
D9MB]. 
129 Nicholas Reimann, Mississippi Becomes First State to Lift Mask Mandate, 
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the wearer as well as those around him.130  Moreover, recent scientific 
studies suggest that masking may not only protect against infection, but 
from severe illness.131 
State governors also issued executive orders to help their state survive 
the economic devastation that corresponded when businesses were largely 
closed and citizens were ordered to shelter in place.132  A number of states 
issued a moratorium on evictions as well a moratorium on utility shut-offs, 
though most of these orders have since expired.133  Some governors issued 
orders to provide for income tax extensions as well as to expedite 
unemployment benefits.134   
The initial set of stay-at-home and other social distancing executive 
orders had a positive effect of reducing COVID-19 transmission 
nationwide,  particularly in the New York City area.135  However, in the 
 
130 Scientific Brief: Use of Cloth Masks to Control the Spread of SARS-CoV-2, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/science-briefs/masking-
science-sars-cov2.html [https://perma.cc/ETG7-Q3PF] (last updated May 7, 2021) 
[hereinafter Scientific Brief]. 
131 Lynn Peeples, Face Masks: What the Data Say, NATURE (Oct. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02801-8 [https://perma.cc/RZ73-
PE2Q]. 
132 See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order N-40-20 (March 30, 2020), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.30.20-N-40-20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Z6F-4JNV] (providing relief for small businesses impacted by 
COVID-19 closures).  In February 2020, the United States had unprecedented low 
unemployment at 3.4% and in June 2020, the unemployment rate rose to a staggering 
11.1%. See News Release 20-0495, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., State 
Employment and Unemployment – February 2020 (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_03272020.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K3RU-8GLB]; News Release 20-1310, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau 
of Lab. Stats., The Employment Situation – June 2020 (Jul. 2, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_07022020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53NW-EKUT]. 
133 Eviction, Mortgage & Foreclosure Relief During COVID-19: 50 State 
Resources, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/covid-19/50-state-covid-19-
resources/eviction-mortgage-foreclosure-relief-during-covid-19-50-state-resource/ 
[https://perma.cc/ACL4-WZAV] (last updated Oct. 2020). 
134 See, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020 105 (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inline-
files/D%202020%20105%20Income%20Tax%20Extension.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CBW3-GFU3] (extending income tax payment deadlines); Mich. 
Exec. Order No. 2020-76 (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-528456--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/L6V8-AS5Z] (expediting unemployment benefits). 
135 See Nathan Layne & Maria Caspani, New York Hospitalizations Fall for First 
Time in Coronavirus Pandemic, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:26 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-new-york/new-york-
20
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summer of 2020, the pandemic moved from the NYC metropolitan area to 
the sunbelt.136  Florida, Texas and Arizona, as the new hot spots, were 
criticized by medical experts for reopening their economies too soon.137  
By early fall, the pandemic centered in many of the midwestern states with 
climbing positivity rates in Iowa, Wisconsin and Illinois.138  By November 
2020, almost all fifty states were experiencing a surge in COVID-19 
cases.139  Just in November 2020 alone, the United States recorded four 
million cases and as of December 1, 2020, COVID-19 had claimed over 
268,000 lives.140  With the surge in cases throughout the United States in 
the fall, a number of state governors or health officials imposed new or 
additional restrictions on their citizens to curb the spread of the virus.141  
For example, in mid-November,  both New Mexico and Oregon issued 
stay-at-home orders in an effort to curb the rising number of cases.142 




136 William H. Frey, A Roaring Sun Belt Surge Has Inverted the Demographics 
and Politics of COVID-19, BROOKINGS (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/06/19/covid-19s-sun-belt-surge-
has-recast-the-pandemics-impact/ [https://perma.cc/V2DP-TFAX]. 
137 See Steve Almasy et. al., Dr. Fauci Says States Like Florida Reopened Too 
Quickly, CNN (July 9, 2020, 9:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/09/health/us-
coronavirus-thursday/index.html [https://perma.cc/6H3X-MLQV]. 
138 Antonia Noori Farzan et. al., More Than 20 States Have Set Records for New 
Coronavirus Cases in Recent Days, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2020, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/13/coronavirus-covid-live-
updates-us/ [https://perma.cc/FH6K-27G2]. 
139 Christina Maxouris, Here’s Exactly How Bad COVID-19 was in November, 
CNN (Dec. 1, 2020, 8:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/01/us/covid-
november-numbers-records/index.html [https://perma.cc/7WP6-W5EA]. 
140 Tariro Mzezewa & Sarah Calahan, U.S. Coronavirus Cases Pass 4 Million 
for the Month of November, Doubling the Record Set in October, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2020, 6:47 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/28/world/covid-19-
coronavirus [https://perma.cc/T4H9-AST4]. 
141 Maxouris, supra note 139. 
142 New Mexico’s stay at home order was issued by its public health official 
whereas the Oregon order was issued by its Governor. See N.M. Pub. Health Order 
(Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://www.rld.state.nm.us/uploads/PressRelease/b88957513a09474898000e52177
885b3/111320_PHO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XD4-RYJ5]; Or. Exec. Order No. 20-
65 (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.oregon.gov/gov/admin/Pages/eo_20-65.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/98HL-9K26] (issuing temporary freeze to address surge in COVID-
19 cases in Oregon).   
143 COVID-19 Update: 21-Day Statewide Curfew, OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH (Nov. 
17, 2020), https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/news-
releases-news-you-can-use/covid-19-update-11-17-20 [https://perma.cc/SDP2-
CAW3]; Kari Paul, California Coronavirus Curfew: What are the Rules and will it 
Work?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
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the White House Coronavirus Task Force found that some governors’ 
actions in the late fall fell short of what was needed to curb further 
transmission of the virus and asked that local public health officials alert 
the local population directly.144 
Many state legislatures have passed few bills concerning the COVID-
19 pandemic leaving it to their governor or state health official to issue 
emergency orders concerning the pandemic.145  If anything, as discussed 
more fully in infra Part III.B., some state legislatures sought judicial 
intervention to limit their governor from exercising some of her 
emergency powers.146   
In the late winter and spring of 2021, about eight state legislatures – 
most notably Kentucky and New York – enacted legislation to limit their 
governor’s emergency powers.147  In response to pressures from 
businesses and what can be described as “pandemic fatigue,” the Kentucky 




144 Betsy Klein, White House Coronavirus Task Force Warn States: “We are in 
a Very Dangerous Place,” CNN (Dec. 2, 2020, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/02/politics/white-house-coronavirus-task-force-states-
report/index.html [https://perma.cc/65LL-HRJ6]. 
145 State Laws in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic 2020, 
BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_laws_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-
19)_pandemic,_2020 [https://perma.cc/LR5M-ZNSQ] (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).  For 
example, more than ten states including large states like Florida and Texas introduced 
less than 10 bills since the beginning of the pandemic. Id. A few states like 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, New Jersey and New York were much more active all 
introducing more than 300 bills.  Id.  But these states were certainly the exception. Id. 
146 Trip Gabriel, State Lawmakers Defy Governors in a COVID-Era Battle for 
Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/us/politics/republicans-democrats-governors-
covid.html [https://perma.cc/9PX3-TMK7] (commenting that more than thirty state 
legislatures were attempting to restrict their governor’s emergency powers). 
147  Samuel Wonacott, Eight States Have Enacted Laws Limiting Governors’ 
Emergency Powers Since the Start of the Pandemic, HEARTLAND DAILY NEWS (Apr. 
17, 2021), https://heartlanddailynews.com/2021/04/eight-states-have-enacted-laws-
limiting-governors-emergency-powers-since-the-start-of-the-pandemic/ 
[https://perma.cc/63QF-Z25B].  In addition to Kentucky and New York, the state 
legislatures in Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Utah all 
passed bills limiting their governor’s powers to respond in an emergency. Id.; see also 
Sarah Nelson & Kaitlin Lange, Gov. Holcom Vetoes Bill that Would Limit Governor’s 
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limiting the governor’s emergency powers.148 The New York legislature 
passed a bill revoking then-Governor Cuomo’s additional powers granted 
to him to manage the pandemic.149   
State agencies have generally issued guidance on COVID-19 but 
have not promulgated regulations going through the more formal notice 
and comment rule-making process.150 Virginia went a different route by 
promulgating an emergency regulation which was “designed to establish 
requirements for employers to control, prevent, and mitigate the spread of 
[COVID-19].”151 The Virginia Department of Labor and Industry posted 
notice of an emergency meeting to consider establishing workplace safety 
standards and also opened up a ten-day public comment forum.152 After 
 
148 See H.B. 1, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (allowing businesses, schools and 
associations to remain open if their plan meets or exceeds current CDC guidance); 
H.B. 5, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (limiting the authority of governor to temporarily 
reorganize administrative agencies without legislative approval); S.B. 1, 2021 Reg. 
Sess. (Ky. 2021) (limiting executive orders concerning in-person meetings to thirty 
days unless extended by legislature); S.B. 2, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (requiring state 
agencies to submit documentation to legislative subcommittee before issuing 
emergency regulations). 
149 See S.B. 5357, 2021-2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).  This bill 
was enacted largely in response to the several recent scandals including allegations of 
the Governor’s sexual misconduct toward female aides and allegations that the 
Governor’s aides altered a health department report undercounting the COVID-19 
fatalities at long-term care facilities. See Jesse McKinley & Luis Ferré-Sadurni, 
Cuomo Faces Revolt as Legislators Move to Strip Him Pandemic Powers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/nyregion/cuomo-nursing-
homes-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/Z47V-DJBA]. 
150 See Kelly Deere & Christine Gottesman, We Can Do This: Reopening the 
Non-Public Office Sector and Keeping it Open During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 16 
RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 10, 17 (2020); Administrative Responses to a Global 
Pandemic: Emergency Rulemaking and Other Mechanisms Agencies Are Employing 




151 See Emergency Temporary Standard, Infectious Disease Prevention: SARS-
CoV-2 Virus That Causes COVID-19, 16 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-220 (July 15, 2020), 
adopted VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-220-10 et seq. (Jan. 27, 2021). The regulation 
provided, among other things, social distancing measures, requiring the wearing of 
facial coverings, access to hand sanitizer and handwashing facilities and increased 
cleanings.  Id. at 2–35. 
152 Lexie Reynolds, et al., Virginia Becomes First State to Pass Permanent 
Workplace Coronavirus Rules, PROSKAUER (Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://www.lawandtheworkplace.com/2021/01/virginia-becomes-first-state-to-pass-
permanent-workplace-coronavirus-rules/ [https://perma.cc/492E-YSQZ].  The 
Virginia agency received over 3400 comments to the proposed regulation. Public 
Comment Forum: Safety and Health Codes Board Electronic Emergency Meeting 
June 24, 2020, VA. REGUL. TOWN HALL, 
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several iterations in June and July of 2020, the Virginia Safety and Health 
Codes Board adopted the emergency regulation which took effect on July 
27, 2020 after publication in a Richmond newspaper.153 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
With governors issuing numerous executive orders limiting the size 
of in-person gatherings, placing a temporary ban on elective surgeries, 
issuing long-term stay-at-home orders, and placing a moratorium on 
evictions among other orders, both individuals and groups began to 
challenge these orders as a violation of their constitutional rights.154  A few 
state legislatures unsuccessfully attempted to use their powers under state 
emergency disaster statutes to terminate their governor’s emergency 
declaration for COVID-19.155  The respective governors challenged these 
actions.156  There were also several challenges to governors’ statutory 
authority to declare a state of emergency.157  Subpart A looks at challenges 
to certain executive orders in the civil right context and subpart B looks at 
challenges to the state legislature’s or governor’s authority under their 
emergency disaster statute on either statutory or constitutional grounds.  
A. Civil Rights Challenges to Specific Executive Orders 
During the earliest parts of the pandemic, most federal district court 
judges addressed civil rights challenges to executive orders through the 
framework of the United States Supreme Court case Jacobson v. 
 
https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/comments.cfm?GeneralNoticeid=1118 
[https://perma.cc/PN9B-SLMG] (last visited May 20, 2021). 
153 Reynolds, supra note 152. 
154 See, e.g., Lesley Gool, Executive Orders and Their Challenges During 
COVID-19, ILL. STATE BAR ASSOC. (Dec. 2020), 
https://www.isba.org/sections/localgovt/newsletter/2020/12/executiveordersandtheir
challengesdu [https://perma.cc/2C5F-UKRY].  It should come as no surprise that a 
number of recent legal scholars have thoroughly recounted and analyzed some of the 
same cases I set out to describe in Part III.  See generally Lindsay Wiley & Stephen 
Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against 
“Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 179-80 (2020); Wiley, 
supra note 70; Wendy Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100 
B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2020); Farber, supra note 87. 
155 See, e.g., Stephen Montemayor, As Legislature Battles Over Gov. Tim Walz’s 




156 See infra Part III.B. 
157 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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Massachusetts.158  Decided more than one hundred years ago, the United 
States Supreme Court in Jacobson first defined the standard for evaluating 
emergency measures though not executive orders per se.159  In Jacobson, 
the Massachusetts state legislature granted the State Board of Health the 
authority to issue a regulation requiring all adults to get a smallpox 
vaccine.160  Defendant refused to be vaccinated and was found guilty for 
violating the health regulation.161  The Supreme Court affirmed the guilty 
verdict and in doing so found that the Court should not infringe on the 
legislature’s power to decide how best to protect the public.162  In fact, the 
Jacobson Court found that the Court’s power to review such legislative 
action is limited to only those statutes that have “no real or substantial 
relation to those objects, or is beyond all question, a plain, palpable 
invasion of rights secured by fundamental law . . . .”163  Some scholars 
have raised serious concerns that courts will simply defer to the governor’s 
emergency orders using the language of Jacobson as a two-part test to 
evaluate the executive order at issue.164  In that sense, applying Jacobson 
in the absence of any meaningful review of the order in the civil rights 
context will eliminate a vital check on the governor’s power.165  Those 
fears may have come to rest.166  While the standard of review may not be 
entirely settled, the Supreme Court’s November 2020 decision in Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo where it applied traditional 
constitutional analysis and not the Jacobson framework to a challenge 
 
158 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
159 Id. at 25. 
160 Id. at 12. 
161 Id. at 13–14. 
162 Id. at 37–38. 
163 Id. at 31. 
164 See Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 154, at 182; Parmet, supra note 154, at 31–
33; Farber, supra note 87, at 18–20.  As discussed more in infra Part V, Wiley, 
Vladeck, Parmet and Farber raised key early concerns about the level of deference the 
courts would afford to state government during the COVID-19 emergency and 
essentially rubber-stamp many of these emergency orders.  And perhaps, their early 
warning signals helped shape some of the judges’ analysis later on.  Even prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, at least one scholar raised similar concerns about the 
suspension of civil liberties during the hurricane Katrina emergency and has argued 
that judges should use strict scrutiny when government officials violate civil liberties 
during an emergency. Michael F. Crusto, State of Emergency: An Emergency 
Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L. REV.  471, 475-76 (2015). 
165 See generally Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
166 As discussed more fully in infra Part V while the recent Supreme Court 
decision may abate concerns that Courts are suspending judicial review, the decision 
raises new concerns about whether the judiciary may be usurping the executive’s role 
in making decisions concerning the public health of its citizens. 
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under the Free Exercise Clause at a minimum diminishes Jacobson’s 
relevance in these pandemic cases.167 
To understand how the federal courts considered various 
constitutional challenges to executive orders from the onset of the 
pandemic through the end of 2020, this article reviewed the most typical 
executive orders involving: (1) limits or bans on non-essential gatherings; 
(2) limit or bans on elective surgeries; (3) stay-at-home orders and 
business closures; (4) moratoriums on evictions; and (5) limits on travel. 
1. Ban or Limits on Non-Essential Gatherings 
A significant number of federal district courts used the Jacobson 
framework to uphold executive orders limiting in-person gatherings 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.168  For example, in Antietam Battlefield 
KOA v. Hogan, the federal district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a 
temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of their Governor’s 
executive order limiting gatherings to no more than ten persons.169  
Applying Jacobson, the district court concluded that the executive order 
had a real and substantial relation to the COVID-19 health crisis citing 
significant evidence in the record.170 Second, the district found that the 
executive orders were not “plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by 
the fundamental law” employing traditional constitutional analysis to the 
second element that the orders were neutral and generally applicable.171   
 
167 See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) 
(per curium) (hereinafter Roman Catholic Diocese). 
168 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 1, 4–6 (2020).  Professor Corbin explains that the typical standard of review 
under the free exercise doctrine requires a two-part examination.  Id. at 4.  First, a 
court should determine whether the challenged law is both neutral and generally 
applicable. Id.  A law is neutral if it does not specifically target religion and that law 
is generally applicable “if it applies broadly to the relevant population.”  Id. at 9.  If 
the law satisfies both criteria, then it is constitutional and the analysis ends. Id. at 6.  
If the challenged law is not both neutral and generally applicable, the law is subject to 
strict scrutiny.  Id. at 4.  Under strict scrutiny, the law “must be justified by a 
compelling government interest and must be narrowly advanced to address that 
interest.”  Id. at 6 n. 25 (citing Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
531–32 (1993)). 
169 Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 223 (D. Md. 2020). 
170 Id. at 229.  Some of the evidence included that COVID-19 spread easily in 
large groups, outbreaks have been linked to large gatherings and that the Governor 
issued the order with the assistance of a public health advisory committee.   Id. 
171 Id. at 223. The court found that the order was neutral because it proscribes 
general conduct and did not target conduct due to religious affiliation.  Id. at 231.  The 
court also found that the order was generally applicable in that analogous secular 
activities such as grocery shopping, going to the movies and sporting events are also 
banned by the order.  Id. at 231–32. 
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Likewise, in Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, the federal district 
court denied plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order as the 
plaintiff Church was unlikely to succeed on its free exercise claim.172  
Plaintiff challenged the Governor’s executive order, which outlined 
Maine’s phased reopening and included a provision that “continued [a] 
prohibition on gatherings of more than ten people.”173  In applying 
Jacobson to the case at hand, the district court concluded it would reach 
the same result if Jacobson was inapplicable, as the executive order likely 
survives plaintiff’s challenge under the Free Exercise Clause.174   
Reaching a different result, in Roberts v. Neace, the Sixth Circuit 
found the Kentucky Governor’s executive order prohibiting all mass 
gatherings in April and May 2020 likely violated the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment.175  The executive order included a number of 
exceptions such as airports, train and bus stations and shopping centers 
and malls.176  However, the Sixth Circuit did not apply Jacobson to the 
facts at hand, but instead applied strict scrutiny to the orders finding that 
the “exception-ridden” order is not neutral.177  In making this finding, the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that it could not distinguish those operations 
exempted from the mass gathering ban such as grocery stores, 
laundromats, airlines and landscaping businesses.178  Nor was the order the 
least restrictive means as this order simply banned gatherings altogether.179  
In a few other instances where plaintiffs were granted relief from a 
governor’s executive orders on free exercise grounds, those orders either 
specifically targeted religious groups or the order was subject to 
interpretation by law enforcement.180 
In late May 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court in South Bay Pentecostal 
Church v. Newsom (“South Bay”) denied the plaintiff church’s emergency 
motion to enjoin Governor Newsom’s stay-at-home order on free exercise 
 
172 459 F. Supp. 3d 273, 286–87 (D. Me. 2020). 
173 Id. at 279. 
174 Id. at 284.  The court also found that the executive order did not likely violate 
the Free Exercise Clause as it was neutral and generally applicable. Id. at 285-86. See 
also Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F.Supp.3d 981, 993–98 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding plethora 
of evidence that executive order was issued to curb spread of COVID-19 under 
Jacobson and alternatively that it would withstand scrutiny under the Free Exercise 
Clause); Gish v. Newsom, No. EDCV 20-755 JGB (KKx), 2020 WL 1979970, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020) (finding executive order met the two-part Jacobson test, 
and alternatively that the executive order did not violate free exercise clause). 
175 Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2020). 
176 Id. at 411. 
177 Id. at 413–15.  The Sixth Circuit simply cites to Jacobson once. Id. at 414. It 
does not incorporate any of that case’s analysis in its decision.  Id. at 411–16. 
178 Id. at 411–12, 16. 
179 Id. at 416. 
         180 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
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grounds.181 The Supreme Court issued its decision without a majority 
opinion, but with Chief Justice Roberts concurring, and Justice Kavanaugh 
issuing a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch.182  While Justice 
Roberts cited to Jacobson, he did not apply the framework, but rather 
concluded that the specific restrictions on religious organizations in 
Newsom’s executive order appeared consistent with the Free Exercise 
Clause as similar restrictions applied to “comparable secular 
gatherings.”183  Justice Roberts found that other similar activities such as 
movie theaters, concerts, and sporting events where large groups of people 
gather for extended periods of time faced similar restrictions.184  And in 
July 2020, the Supreme Court in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak 
denied the plaintiff church’s request for relief without a majority 
opinion.185  This time no justices concurred, but three dissented.186  The 
plaintiff Church challenged the Nevada Governor’s emergency directive 
limiting indoor religious gatherings and some other businesses to no more 
than fifty persons.187  The dissenting justices voiced concern with the 
comparison group.188  Rather than focusing on lectures, concerts and 
museums, the dissents all argued that bars, restaurants and even casinos 
should be the focus of the comparison.189  
On November 25, 2020, with the addition of Justice Barrett on the 
Court, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. 
Cuomo in a per curium opinion enjoined then-Governor’s Cuomo 
executive order which limited gathering capacity of religious 
organizations in certain zones to ten or twenty-five people.190 The case also 
contained two separate lone concurrences by Justices Gorsuch and 
Kavanaugh and three separate dissents.191  Plaintiffs, a Church and a 
 
         181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1613–14. 
183 Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C. J., concurring). 
184 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
185 See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020). 
186 Id. at 2603-09.  Justice Alito filed a dissent which was joined by Justices 
Thomas and Kavanaugh. Id. at 2603 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice Gorsuch and 
Justice Kavanaugh both filed separate dissents. Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 2604 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
188 See, e.g., id.  at 2607. 
189 See id. at 2604; Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Id. at 2609–10 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
190 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68–69 (2020).  
The Justices fell along similar lines as in the decisions of South Bay and Calvary 
Chapel Dayton with the new Justice, Amy Coney Barrett, aligning with Justices 
Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to make the new majority.  See supra notes 
181-82, 185-86. 
191 See Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer’s dissent was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.  Id. at 76 
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synagogue, argued that the executive order violated their constitutional 
rights under the Free Exercise Clause.192  The Court found that since the 
executive order explicitly targets “houses of worship for especially harsh 
treatment” the order is subject to strict scrutiny.193  Specifically, it found 
that the order allowed certain businesses such as acupuncture facilities, 
campgrounds and garages to function without capacity restrictions while 
places of worship had ten or twenty-five person capacity restrictions.194 
The Court also noted that these restrictions were more severe than other 
restrictions that had come before it. Nor was the executive order likely 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”195  While the Court 
acknowledged that reducing the spread of COVID-19 is “unquestionably” 
a compelling interest, it found that plaintiffs offered evidence that they 
followed strict COVID-19 safety protocols and defendant did not provide 
evidence of an outbreak in either institution.196  The Court also took issue 
with the fact that the order limited capacity to only ten or twenty-five 
persons when many places of worship seat hundreds or thousands of 
individuals.197  Noticeably absent in the per curium opinion is any direct 
reference to the Supreme Court’s two most recent decisions in South Bay 
and Calvary Chapel Dayton, or the older Jacobson precedent.198  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roman Catholic Diocese may have 
raised more questions than it answered.  While the per curium opinion did 
not apply the Jacobson framework (much less even cite to it), the Court 
 
(Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor’s 
separate dissent was also joined by Justice Kagan. Id. at 78 (Sotomayor, J., joined by 
Kagan, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. at 66. 
193 Id. at 66–67. 




198 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); S. Bay Pentecostal Church 
v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 
S. Ct. 2603 (2020).  Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese 
criticizes Justice Roberts’ concurrence in South Bay arguing that Roberts’ reliance 
on Jacobson is misplaced. Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring).  Justice Gorsuch is the only non-dissenting justice to even mention 
Jacobson, and he does so at length. Id. at 70–72 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).   In his 
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts only mentions Jacobson in response to Justice 
Gorsuch’s concurrence. Id. at 75–76 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  He argues that 
Gorsuch overreacted to Roberts’ one-sentence quotation to Jacobson in South Bay. 
Id. at 75–76 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  That same quote was cited positively by 
Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence as well as in Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 73, 
78. Justice Sotomayor in her dissent took aim at Justice Gorsuch’s non-secular 
comparisons, arguing that they were not square with the medical examples. Id. at 79 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
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did not overrule the 115-year precedent or even attempt to limit its 
application going forward.199 These unresolved issues are evident in the 
cases coming on the heels of this decision.   
 These recent cases are a reflection of the Court’s striking omission.  
About a week after Roman Catholic Diocese, the Sixth Circuit in 
Commonwealth v. Beshear denied a preliminary injunction to private 
religious schools who challenged the Kentucky Governor’s executive 
order closing all private and public elementary and secondary schools.200  
Unlike Roman Catholic Diocese, the Sixth Circuit found Governor 
Beshear’s executive order to be neutral and of general applicability as the 
order did not single out religious institutions.201  But where the executive 
order specifically mentions houses of worship in its restrictions, other 
courts post-Roman Catholic Diocese applied strict scrutiny.202  The 
plaintiffs in both Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley and in Roman Catholic 
Diocese succeeded in their motions to enjoin enforcement of their 
Governor’s executive order imposing capacity restrictions on houses of 
worship.203  In December, the Ninth Circuit in Calvary Chapel Dayton 
Valley said that Roman Catholic Diocese requires it to apply strict scrutiny 
to the Governor’s executive order which capped religious services at fifty 
persons while casinos, gyms and bowling alleys, among other secular 
activities, were only restricted to 50% of fire code capacity.204  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the order is not narrowly tailored as there were less 
restrictive alternatives to the fifty-person cap such as a 50% capacity 
restriction.205  Likewise, the Second Circuit applied strict scrutiny to then-
Governor Cuomo’s executive order which also imposed a percentage 
capacity restriction of 25% or 33% for places of worship in red or orange 
zones.206   
 
199 Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
200 981 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2020). 
201 Commonwealth, 981 F.3d at 509.  The Sixth Circuit makes it a point to say 
that it has no need to rely upon either South Bay or Jacobson in reaching it decision.  
Id. at 510. 
202 See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 
2020); Agudath Israel v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 632–33 (2d Cir. 2020). 
203 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 982 F.3d at 1234; Agudath Israel, 983 F.3d 
at 632–33. 
204 This is the same directive plaintiff sought to enjoin back in May 2020 but 
was unsuccessful Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 982 F.3d at 1230, 1233. 
205 Id. at 1234. 
206 Agudath Israel, 983 F.3d at 632–33. This is the same executive order at issue 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Roman Catholic Diocese. Id. at 631–32. The 
executive order imposed either a person limit or percentage capacity restriction on 
places of worship in certain zones. Id. at 625–26.  The Supreme Court only looked at 
the fixed capacity limits, not the percentage capacity limits. Id. at 636-37.  The Second 
Circuit granted Agudath Israel’s motion to enjoin enforcement of the order but 
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In contrast, the plaintiffs in South Bay Pentecostal Church did not 
succeed in their motion to enjoin Governor Newsom’s executive order 
limiting worship services in certain regions to outdoor gatherings.207  The 
federal district court also applied strict scrutiny to the Governor’s 
executive order, but found that the order was narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling state interest.208  The district court distinguished the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley in that Governor 
Newsom’s executive order does not treat similar secular activities like 
restaurants, bars and gyms more favorably.209  In fact, the court concluded 
that many of these activities with “heightened risk profiles are entirely 
closed.”210 
It seemed as if the Jacobson framework had been abandoned with 
these three previous decisions.  In Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, the 
Ninth Circuit did not address whether Jacobson should be considered in 
its analysis even though the Governor argued that the Jacobson framework 
applies during this public health crisis.211 The Second Circuit found that 
any reliance on Jacobson is misplaced.212  Further, the federal district court 
in South Bay does not even mention Jacobson.213  However, Jacobson is 
alive and well at least according to two recent federal district court 
opinions each denying plaintiffs’ motion for emergency relief.214  Neither 
decision concerns a free exercise challenge and both decisions applied 
rational basis review and alternatively the Jacobson framework.215  But 
their reasons for doing so are clear.  Both district courts found that 
“Jacobson is controlling precedent until the Supreme Court . . . tells us 
otherwise.”216 
 
remanded to the district court to determine whether the fixed capacity limits survive 
strict scrutiny.  Id. 
207 S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-00865-BAS-AHG, 2020 
WL 7488974, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020), aff’d, 985 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2021). 
208 Id. at *8. 
209 Id. at *11. 
210 Id. 
211 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 982 F.3d at 1231. 
212 Agudath Israel v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 635 (2d Cir. 2020). 
213 2020 WL 7488974, at *1–13. 
214 Delaney v. Baker, No. 20-11154-WGY, 2021 WL 42340, at *13–14 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 6, 2021) (concerning challenge to executive order mandating wearing of 
face masks in public); M. Rae, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 1:20-CV-2366, 2020 WL 7642596, 
at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2020) (concerning challenge to executive order banning 
indoor dining). 
215 See Delaney, No. 20-11154-WGY, 2021 WL 42340, at 13–14; M. Rae, Inc. 
v. Wolf, No. 1:20-CV-2366, 2020 WL 7642596, at *6. 
216 M. Rae, Inc., 2020 WL 7642596, at *6; Delaney, 2021 WL 42340, at *11 
(finding that “until the Supreme Court overrules Jacobson, this Court is bound by stare 
decisis to apply Jacobson harmoniously with the precedent developed under the tiers 
of scrutiny.”). 
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2. Ban or Limits on Elective Surgical Procedures 
Even more complicated are evaluating executive orders that impact a 
woman’s right to abortion, though all of these decisions predate the 
Supreme Court decisions in South Bay, Calvary Chapel Dayton and 
Roman Catholic Diocese.  Within the Jacobson framework, the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits considered whether an executive order 
prohibiting and/or limiting elective medical procedures for a period of 
time violates a woman’s right to an abortion with differing outcomes.217  
Divided circuit panels in the Fifth and Eighth Circuit vacated their 
respective district court’s temporary restraining order (“TRO”) allowing 
the executive orders to continue.218  Those TROs had essentially exempted 
abortions from the respective Governor’s executive order postponing non-
essential surgeries for a period of time due to COVID-19.  The Fifth 
Circuit in In re Abbott based its holding on three considerations 
emphasizing that the district court failed to apply the Jacobson standard 
for evaluating emergency orders to this case.219  It found the executive 
order easily met both Jacobson elements.  As to the first Jacobson 
element, the court found that the order helped curb transmission of 
COVID-19 since restricting the number of medical procedures both 
reduced hospital capacity and conserved personal protective equipment 
(PPE).220  As to the second Jacobson element, the court found that the 
executive order did not place an “undue burden” on getting an abortion as 
set forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.221  
 
217 See Robinson v. Att’y. Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182–84 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(applying Jacobson to deny stay of district court’s preliminary injunction on state 
health officer’s order postponing all non-emergency medical procedures during 
COVID-19.); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2020) (ordering district 
court to dissolve its TRO enjoining Arkansas “from enforcing a health directive 
against a provider of surgical abortions.”); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 
913, 916–17 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding in part and modifying in part district court’s 
preliminary injunction on against executive order), vacated and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 
1262 (2021); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 777–78 (5th Cir. 2020) (granting writ of 
mandamus directing vacatur of district court’s TRO against executive order), vacated 
and remanded by Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 
(2021). 
218 Abbott, 954 F.3d at 778; Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1023. 
219 Abbott, 954 F.3d at 778–79.  The Fifth Circuit also found the district court’s 
decision patently wrong for declaring that the executive order was an outright ban on 
abortion instead of applying the Casey undue burdens test.  Id. at 778.  And that “the 
district court usurped the state’s authority to craft emergency health measures.” Id. 
220 Id. at 787. 
221 Id. at 786, 791. Casey holds that a state may regulate, not ban abortion and in 
regulating abortion it may not place a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus retains viability.” Planned Parenthood of Se. 
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In finding that the order met the Casey test, the court emphasized that this 
was a three week emergency order and not an outright ban on abortion.222  
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in In re Rutledge found that the district court 
“failed to meaningfully apply” the Jacobson framework as the standard of 
review.223   
The Eleventh Circuit in Robinson v. Attorney General reached a 
different result. Even though the court applied Jacobson, it concluded that 
the state’s public health order, which  mandated postponement of all 
“dental, medical or surgical procedures” was likely in violation of the right 
to an abortion.224  In affirming the district court’s decision, the Eleventh 
Circuit reading Jacobson and Casey together found that the state was 
unlikely to succeed on the merits and recounted significant evidence in the 
record in support of this conclusion.225  The state argued the order was 
issued to conserve PPE, free up hospital capacity, and reduce social 
interactions.226  However, the clinics still needed PPE to treat these women 
for ongoing pre-natal visits and pre-abortion examinations and these 
additional examinations may actually require more PPE.227  The evidence 
also indicated that the number of abortions requiring hospitalizations are 
quite low.228  And finally, there was evidence that banning abortions, even 
temporarily, would increase, not decrease, social interactions as even an 
uncomplicated pregnancy involves ten to thirteen prenatal visits.229  
Decided a day later, the Sixth Circuit in Adams & Boyle v. Slatery similarly 
concluded that plaintiff health providers would likely succeed on the 
merits in showing that the state’s emergency executive order banning 
elective surgical procedures for a period of time violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to an abortion.230  As with Robinson, the Sixth Circuit 
had a significant factual record which met both Casey’s undue burden test 
and the Jacobson test.231  Even though Jacobson may no longer be the 
 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). This is known as the undue burdens 
test. Id. at 942 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
222 Abbott, 954 F.3d at 790–91. 
223 Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1028. 
224 Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1182. 
225 Id. at 1182.  For example, there was evidence in the record that postponing 
an abortion would amount to a prohibition as most abortions in Alabama must be 
performed before the fetus reaches twenty weeks.  Id. at 1180. There was also evidence 
that the order would create logistical challenges for women as well as causing serious 
harm to a woman’s health. Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 1182. 
228 Id. at 1181. 
229 Id. at 1182. 
230 956 F.3d at 925. 
231 Id. at 920–22, 924–27. The Sixth Circuit employed the Jacobson test in the 
alternative saying that “even if Jacobson’s more state friendly standard of review is 
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standard of review here, these decisions would still likely stand.232  
Plaintiffs in both Robinson and Adams & Boyle were able to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits notwithstanding the federal appellate 
courts using a standard of review allowing for greater deference to the 
state.233 
3. Stay-at-Home Orders and Restrictions on Businesses 
Unlike challenges under the Free Exercise Clause and the right to 
abortion which often requires the order to be subject to heightened 
scrutiny, most challenges to stay-at-home orders had to pass the rational 
basis test or in some cases intermediate scrutiny.234  For example, in 
McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, the district court applying the Jacobson 
framework found that the stay-at-home order did not likely violate 
plaintiff’s substantive due process rights.235  The court said that the stay-
at-home order provided for some exceptions as citizens were able to leave 
home to exercise, care for family members or friends, work or buy 
essential goods.236  While couched within the Jacobson framework, the 
court made clear that the Governor had significant evidence to support the 
conclusion that COVID-19 was a public health emergency necessitating 
the stay-at-home order.237 
Like McGhee – but without applying the Jacobson framework – the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Friends of Danny Devito v. Wolf held that 
Governor Wolf’s stay-at-home order did not violate plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights.238  In reviewing each of plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used traditional constitutional 
 
the test we should be applying here – rather than the usual Roe and Casey standard – 
we still think that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their constitutional claim.”  Id. at 
925. 
232 Id. 
233 Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1182; Adams & Boyle; 956 F.3d at 920–22, 924–27. 
234 Henry, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1254–55 (applying rational basis review); McGhee, 
2020 WL 2308479, at *5 (applying heightened level of scrutiny).  The most significant 
challenge to a stay-at-home order came early on in Wisconsin Legis. v. Palm, 942 
N.W.2d 900 (2020) discussed at length in infra Part III.B. 
235 McGhee, 2020 WL 2308479, at *5–6.  In a similar vein, the plaintiff in Henry 
v. DeSantis alleged constitutional violations including violations under the 14th due 
process and equal protection clauses.  461 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.  That court applying 
the rational basis test found that the petitioner’s claims failed as the Governor’s stay 
at home order was issued to slow the spread of COVID-19 which is a legitimate 
government interest.  Id. at 1255. 
236 McGhee, 2020 WL 2308479, at *5. 
237 Id. at *3–5. 
238 Friends of Danny Devito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 903 (Pa. 2020). 
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analysis and did not apply the Jacobson framework or cite to Jacobson 
anywhere in its opinion.239   
However, the district court in Open Our Oregon v. Brown used the 
Jacobson framework to find that the Oregon Governor’s executive order 
which closed plaintiffs’ businesses had not violated their constitutional 
rights.240  And, in the Sixth Circuit case League of Independent Fitness 
Facilities and Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, the federal appellate court granted 
a stay of the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of the Governor’s executive order closing fitness facilities for 
a period of time.241  The Sixth Circuit cited to Jacobson, recognizing that 
the state’s police power to address pandemics should proceed largely 
without interference from the courts.242  Yet, the federal appellate court 
applied the traditional constitutional analysis—finding that the executive 
order met the rational basis test.243   
And at least one stay-at-home order survived intermediate scrutiny.244  
In Altman v. County of Santa Clara, firearms dealers challenged the 
California County’s shelter in place order as violating its Second 
Amendment Right to Bear Arms.245  In Altman, the district court found 
that “it need not decide whether Jacobson or the Ninth Circuit’s Second 
 
239 Id. at 896–903.  For example, in analyzing Plaintiff, Devito Committee’s 
claim under the equal protection clause, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized 
that “while the equal protection clause assures that all similarly situated persons are 
treated alike, it does not obligate the government to treat all persons identically.”  Id. 
at 901 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 215 (Pa. 2006)). 
240  Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-cv-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861, at *2 
(D. Or. May 19, 2020). In almost complete deference to the state’s interest in 
combating COVID-19, the district court concluded that it “is inclined to side with the 
chorus of federal courts in pointing to Jacobson and rejecting similar constitutional 
claims . . . .” Id. 
241 League of Indep. Fitness Facility & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 814 Fed. Appx. 
125, 129–30 (6th Cir. 2020). 
242 Id. at 127. 
243 Id. at 128–29.  The Governor in its brief to the district court provided 
information citing to the CDC on how indoor facilities are more susceptible to spread 
of the virus.  Id. at 128.  The Sixth Circuit found this information as a “paradigmatic 
example of ‘rational speculation’ that fairly support the Governor’s treatment of 
indoor fitness facilities.”  Id. at 129. 
244 See, e.g., Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111, 1132 
(N.D. Cal. 2020). 
245 Id. at 1111; but cf. Conn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 465 F. Supp. 
3d 56, 72–73 (D. Conn. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny in finding that the 
Governor’s order which had the effect of suspending fingerprinting indefinitely – a 
necessary requirement for obtaining a gun in Connecticut – likely violated Second 
Amendment). 
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Amendment framework applies here because . . .  the Court concludes that 
the order survives under either test.”246   
In a marked departure from the above cases, the federal district court 
in County of Butler v. Wolf declared that Governor Wolf’s stay-at-home 
order, which was no longer in effect, violated plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  Foreshadowing Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion 
in Roman Catholic Diocese, Judge Stickman found the Jacobson 
framework to be inappropriate for the standard of review saying he would 
apply “regular” constitutional scrutiny.247  He struck down this order on 
the assumption that Governor Wolf would reinstate it and that the state’s 
compelling interest in curbing the spread of COVID-19 had waned due to 
the ongoing length of the pandemic.248  Judge Stickman all but ignored the 
scientific evidence behind the pandemic including COVID-19’s high 
transmissibility necessitating the stay-at-home order not just in the 
Commonwealth but throughout the globe.249  And he made the leap on his 
own accord to apply strict scrutiny to plaintiffs’ substantive due process 
claims even though longstanding precedent applied intermediate 
scrutiny.250   
4. Moratorium on Evictions 
While a significant number of Americans appreciated their 
governor’s executive order placing a moratorium on evictions, several 
dissatisfied landlords challenged these orders.251  For example, in 
Elmsford Apartment. Assoc., LLC v. Cuomo, three residential landlords, 
challenged then-Governor Cuomo’s executive order temporarily 
permitting tenants to use their security deposit for rent and placing a 
moratorium on evictions as violating their rights under the Takings Clause 
 
246  Altman, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 1125.  The district court found that the executive 
order met the two element Jacobson test.  Id. at 1124.  The Court then determined 
intermediate, not strict scrutiny applied as the order merely regulated the manner of 
possession as opposed to an outright ban of firearms.  Id. at 1126, 1128. 
247 Id. at 899.  Judge Stickman detailed at length his reasons for declining to 
adopt Jacobson to this case which included the ongoing nature of the pandemic and 
the need for an independent judiciary citing Wiley and Vladeck’s article on the 
suspension doctrine.  Id. at 899–901 (citing Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 154). 
248 See id. at 899. 
249 Id. at 916–18. 
250 Id. at 916–17; see also Wiley, supra note 70, at 93.  Wiley argues that Judge 
Stickman erroneously applied the incorrect standard of review to plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process claim as “[e]conomic rights to use one’s property and earn 
one’s livelihood as one sees fit have been overwhelmingly rejected as a basis for 
applying strict scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution in the modern era.”  Id. 
251 See, e.g., Elmsford Apartment Assocs., L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 
148, 155–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
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and Contracts Clause of the Constitution.252  Employing traditional 
constitutional analysis, the federal district court denied plaintiffs’ 
claims.253  Similar challenges by landlords in other states where there was 
an executive order placing a moratorium on evictions likewise failed.254   
5. Travel Restrictions – Mandatory Self Quarantining  
The few challenges to executive orders requiring those entering the 
state to quarantine have largely been unsuccessful though the courts in 
these cases often applied different standards of review.255  For example, in 
Bailey Campground Inc. v. Mills, in-state business owners and out of state 
individuals challenged the Maine Governor’s executive orders, which 
prohibited out of state residents from entering the state unless they owned 
or could rent property as violating their right to travel.256  While the district 
court, applying strict scrutiny, found that the Governor’s executive orders 
burdened Plaintiffs’ right to travel, it found that plaintiffs had not proved 
that the “measure is not the least burdensome way to serve a compelling 
interest.”257  The district court emphasized that the standard of review in 
this case was governed by the jurisprudence concerning the right to travel, 
and not the judicial framework in Jacobson.258   
About a month later in Carmichael v. Ige, the district court in Hawaii 
similarly held that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their challenge 
to the Governor’s fourteen-day travel quarantine.259  Unlike the Court in 
 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 156.  The district court did not use the Jacobson framework in its 
analysis.  See id. at 165.  Instead, the district court applied the three- factor test in Penn 
Central Trans. Co. v. New York City to determine if the interference with plaintiff’s 
property constituted a taking.  Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493 (1987)). 
254 See, e.g., Heights Apartments, L.L.C. v. Walz, No. 20-CV-2051, 2020 WL 
7828818, at *12, *14, *16 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 2020) (finding that executive order 
placing moratorium on evictions did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under 
Contracts Clause, Takings Clause and First Amendment of United States 
Constitution); Baptiste v. Kennealy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 353, 382 (D. Mass. 2020) 
(finding that landlords were unlikely to succeed on the merits that the moratorium 
constituted a taking under the Contract Clause); Auracle Homes, L.L.C. v. Lamont, 
478 F. Supp. 3d 199. 207 (D. Conn. 2020) (denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 
injunction to enjoin enforcement of executive order allowing tenants to use security 
deposit for rent and placing moratorium on evictions). 
255 Compare Bayley’s Campground, Inc. v. Mills, 463 F. Supp. 3d 22, 32 (D. 
Maine 2020), aff’d, 985 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2021), with Carmichael v. Ige, 470 F. Supp. 
3d 1133, 1143 (D. Haw. 2020). 
256 Bayley’s Campground, 463 F. Supp. 3d at 24. 
257 Id. at 33–34 
258 Id. at 32. 
259 Carmichael, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1146–47. 
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Bailey Campground, Judge Otake in Carmichael emphasized that the 
Jacobson framework applied though she applied traditional constitutional 
analysis to the second element.260  And in Page v. Cuomo, the district court 
held that then-Governor Cuomo’s executive order requiring those entering 
New York to submit to a fourteen-day quarantine did not likely violate 
plaintiff’s right to travel.261  However, and more surprisingly, the Page 
court’s August decision fully embraced the Jacobson framework.262   
B. Challenges to the Emergency Declaration/Executive Order 
Process 
Not surprisingly, some state governors and legislatures have 
disagreed on how to best manage the COVID-19 pandemic particularly 
where the legislature and executive branches were from different political 
parties.263 In some hotly contested litigation between state legislatures and 
governors, the states’ highest courts weighed in on the current process and 
procedure for declaring, extending and terminating a state declaration of 
emergency.264   
1. State Legislative Authority to Terminate or Extend Governor’s 
Emergency Declaration or Order  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Wolf. v. Scarnati stepped in 
during a dispute between the Pennsylvania legislature and the Governor 
concerning whether the state legislature could through concurrent 
resolution unilaterally end the state of the emergency without going 
through the formal process of presenting any such resolution to the 
governor for signature or veto.265  The Emergency Management Services 
Code provides in pertinent part: “[n]o state of disaster emergency may 
continue for longer than 90 days unless renewed by the Governor.  The 
General Assembly by concurrent resolution may terminate a state of 
 
260 Id. at 1142–47.  Judge Otake applied the Jacobson two-element test to the 
facts of the case.  Id. at 1143.  First, she easily concluded that the 14-day quarantine 
had a real and substantial relation to public health.  Id. at 1143.  She cited from the 
record that the incubation period for COVID–19 can be up to 14 days.  Id.  Second, 
she found that the fourteen-day quarantine is not a travel ban, but rather a restriction 
for which one must comply.  Id. at 1145.  And even assuming the quarantine imposed 
a burden on travel and applying strict scrutiny, plaintiffs still are not likely to succeed. 
Id. at 1146. 
261 Page v. Cuomo, 478 F. Supp. 3d 355, 359, 369 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). 
262 Id. at 366–67. 
263 See, e.g., Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 686 (Pa. 2020). 
264 Id. at 684. 
265 Id. 
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disaster emergency at any time.”266  On June 9, 2020, the Pennsylvania 
Senate and General Assembly passed a concurrent resolution which 
ordered the Governor to end the current state of emergency which had 
been in effect since early March.267  The concurrent resolution was not 
presented to the Governor for his signature or veto.268  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the State Assembly’s concurrent resolution 
required presentment to the Governor for his signature or veto and without 
presentment, the resolution was null and void.269  If the legislative intent 
behind the Emergency Management Code was to bypass the Governor’s 
role here, the Code would not have the additional requirement that the 
Governor terminate the emergency declaration once a resolution had been 
issued.270 
Likewise, in Kelly v. Legislative Coordinating Council, the Kansas 
State Legislature through its appointed council attempted to revoke the 
Governor’s executive order limiting mass gatherings.271  Within fifteen 
days of Governor Kelly declaring an emergency due to COVID-19, the 
legislature, by concurrent resolution, extended the emergency declaration 
until May 1, 2020 and, among other things, provided for a contingency if 
the legislature was not in session.272  A day after Governor Kelly issued an 
executive order which no longer exempted religious gatherings from the 
ten-person limit, the legislative coordinating council (“LCC”) voted to 
revoke it.273  The Kansas Supreme Court held that the LCC did not have 
the authority to revoke the order since the concurrent resolution explicitly 
stated it only had authority to act “following such state finance council 
action.”274  The court found that “the step involving the state finance 
council must occur before the LCC’s challenged authority is triggered.”275  
 
266 Id. at 685 (emphasis in original) (quoting PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2016)); 
see PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2016). 
267 Scarnati, 233 A.3d at 685–86. 
268 See id. at 687. 
269 Id. at 707. 
270 Id. 
271 Kelly v. Legis. Coordinating Council, 460 P.3d 832, 837 (Kan. 2020). 
272 Id. at 836.  First, upon application by the Governor, the State Finance Council 
could authorize a one-time extension of the emergency declaration.  Id.  And second, 
“following such state finance action”, the Legislative Coordinating Council may 
terminate a declaration of emergency or revoke an executive order.  Id. at 836–37. 
273 Id. at 837. 
274 Id. at 839. 
275 Id. 
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2. Governor or State Health Official’s Statutory Authority to Issue 
Emergency Declaration or Executive Order  
On April 21, 2020, when most of the country was still on lockdown, 
the Republican controlled Wisconsin State Legislature brought suit against 
the state’s Secretary of Health for issuing a second stay-at-home order in 
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm (“Palm”).276  In Palm, a divided Wisconsin 
Supreme  Court held that the second emergency stay-at-home order issued 
by the top state health official was unenforceable.277  To be clear, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court majority emphasized that its decision in Palm 
was about the “assertion of power of one unelected official” and not about 
the Wisconsin Governor’s “[e]mergency order or the powers of the 
Governor.”278  Indeed, the emergency order before the court, Order 28, 
issued by the top state health official, was not issued pursuant to the 
Governor’s public health emergency declaration but rather by Wis. Stat. § 
252.02(3).279  The majority found that Emergency Order 28 was 
unenforceable for two reasons.280  First, Order 28 was a rule and as such 
Palm needed to follow the rule-making procedures for promulgating such 
a rule, which she did not do.281  Second, Palm exceeded her authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 252.02 when she confined people to their homes, restricted 
travel, and ordered businesses be closed.282 
In June 2020, the Oregon Supreme Court in Elkhorn Baptist Church 
v. Brown held that the Oregon Governor’s declaration of emergency 
concerning COVID-19 was proper.283  The Oregon Supreme Court found 
that the declaration did not expire under Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 401.165 and 
that the Governor was not required to specifically declare a public health 
emergency under Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433.441(1) which had a twenty-
 
276 Wis. Legislature. v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 906–07 (Wis. 2020). 
277 Id. at 918. 
278 Id. at 904–05. 
279 Id. at 906.  Emergency Order 28 was issued on April 16,2020 and superseded 
Emergency Order 12.  Id.  Emergency Order 12 was issued on March 24, 2020 
pursuant to “Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) and (6) and all of the powers invested in [her] 
through Executive Order #72, and at the direction of Governor Tony Evers[.]”  Id. at 
906 (alterations in the original) (emphasis added). 
280 Id. at 918. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. While Palm argued that she was provided broad powers under Chapter 
252 of the Wisconsin Statutes to respond to COVID-19 as a communicable disease, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority was unpersuaded.  Id. at 915–16.  First, the 
majority found that since Palm did not follow rule making procedures, there can be no 
criminal penalties for violation of the order.  Id. at 918.  Second, her orders went 
beyond the statutory powers.  Id.  For example, while Palm had authority to quarantine 
those infected or suspected to be infected, her order requiring all citizens to stay home 
exceeded her authority under statute.  Id. at 916. 
283 Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown, 466 P.3d 30, 35–36 (Or. 2020). 
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eight day statutory time limit.284  Plaintiffs’ argued that all of the 
Governor’s executive orders are no longer enforceable as the situation was 
really a “public health emergency” and any such declaration would have 
expired after twenty-eight days.285   The court explained that the Governor 
had several avenues for addressing the COVID-19 pandemic under 
Oregon law.286  The Oregon Supreme Court found that the Governor had 
the discretion when faced with a public health emergency to use either 
statute.287  It also saw no conflict in the Governor doing so.288  The court 
reasoned that “[o]ne of the reasons the ORS chapter 433 emergency 
statutes were enacted was to give the Governor an option for responding 
to a public health emergency by taking a step short of declaring a state of 
emergency under chapter 401.”289  The Court also found that the two 
statutes were intended to work together.290  In fact, Chapter 433 
specifically states that nothing in that statute limits the Governor’s ability 
to declare a state of emergency under Chapter 401.291 
A few months later, the Michigan Supreme Court was confronted 
with a similar situation in In re Certified Questions where the Michigan 
Governor based her declaration of emergency concerning COVID-19 on 
 
284 Id. at 38, 45, 52. 
285 Id. at 38–39.  Plaintiffs were a number of churches and churchgoers and later 
a number of individuals, local officials and businesses owners intervened and filed 
their own complaint.  Id. at 35, 39.  Plaintiffs also made an alternative argument that 
the emergency declaration should have expired after 30 days under Article X-A of the 
Oregon Constitution.  Id. at 39.  The court held that the Governor did not invoke the 
extraordinary powers provided to her under the state constitution in response to a 
catastrophic disaster.  Id. at 51. 
286 Id. at 38.  The first way is via OR. REV. STAT § 401.165 which is Oregon’s 
general emergency disaster statute.  Id. at 36.  That statute authorizes the Governor to 
declare a state of emergency and with that declaration the Governor is vested with 
broad authority including the right to exercise police powers. Id.  OR. REV. STAT. § 
401.165 does not have any durational limits, but the Governor is to terminate the state 
of emergency when it no longer exists.  Id.  And the legislature may terminate the state 
of emergency at any time through a joint resolution.  Id.  A second more limited avenue 
would be for the Governor to declare a public health emergency under OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 433.441(1).  Id. at 38.  As with § 401.165, the public health emergency declaration 
under § 433.441(1) gives the Governor certain emergency powers but is more limited.  
Id. at 45.  OR. REV. STAT. § 433.441(1), however, has a statutory durational limitation 
of twenty-right days.  Id. at 38. 
287 Id. at 45. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
290 See id. at 48. 
291 Id.  ORE. REV. STAT. § 433.441(4) provides that the Governor who declares 
a state of emergency under Chapter 401 is authorized to implement any action 
provided under Chapter 433. Id. 
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two separate emergency statutes.292  The Michigan Supreme Court 
examined the Governor’s authority under both of these statutes: the 
Emergency Management Act of 1976 (the “EMA”) and the Emergency 
Powers of the Governor’s Act of 1945 (the “EPGA”).293   
The context was key in the court’s analysis and decision.  On March 
10, 2020, Michigan Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency due 
to the COVID-19 pandemic under both the EMA and EPGA.  And on 
March 23, 2020, she issued a stay-at-home order.294  On April 1, 2020, the 
Governor again issued a state of emergency under the EMA and EPGA 
and asked the State Legislature in accordance with the EMA to extend the 
emergency for an additional seventy days.295  The Legislature extended the 
state of emergency but only until April 30, 2020.296  On April 30, 2020, 
the Governor terminated the state of emergency under the EMA but issued 
another order stating that the state of emergency was still in effect under 
the EPGA.297  She then issued an executive order “redeclaring” the state 
of emergency under the EMA.298   
For the first question, the Michigan Supreme Court provided a 
unified and clear holding that the Governor lacked authority to issue any 
further executive orders after April 30 under the EMA.299  The Michigan 
EMA gives the Governor the authority to declare a state of emergency and 
also provides that “[a]fter 28 days, the Governor shall issue an executive 
order or proclamation declaring the state of emergency terminated, unless 
a request by the governor for an extension of the state of disaster for a 
specified number of days has been approved by both houses of the 
legislature…”300  The Michigan high court found that the Governor 
redeclared an identical emergency to bypass the legislature’s limitation on 
her authority.301  The court reasoned that, to give effect to the Governor’s 
actions here would be tantamount to ignoring the plain statutory language 
of the EMA in providing the legislature power to limit the Governor’s 
authority.302 
 
292 In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 2020) [hereinafter In re Certified Questions]. 
293 Id. at 7. 
294 Id. at 6. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 6–7. 
297 Id. at 7. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 6. 
300 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
301 Id. at 10. 
302 Id.  On March 31, 2021, the Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly held that 
Governor Evers exceeded his statutory authority under that state’s emergency disaster 
statute when he continually reissued emergency declarations notwithstanding the 
statute’s clear language that the emergency declaration expires after sixty days unless 
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The second question concerned whether the EPGA was 
constitutional.303  In a divided decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held 
that the EPGA violated the Michigan Constitution because the statute 
“constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive 
. . . .”304  In doing so, the majority took issue with the broad powers 
provided to the Governor under the EPGA to “promulgate reasonable 
orders, rules and regulations that he or she considers necessary to protect 
life and property.”305 Having delegated such broad powers to the 
Governor, the majority looked to see if the EPGA provided sufficient 
checks on this power.306  First, the majority found the legislature did not 
have any check on the duration of the Governor’s emergency declaration 
under the EPGA.307  Second, the majority found that the EPGA provided 
no legislative standard or direction guiding the Governor in exercising 
these broad powers.308  Finding no reasonable check on the Governor’s 
broad powers under the EPGA, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded 
the statute was unconstitutional.309  And with the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s decision, Governor Whitmer went from having two avenues of 
emergency powers to none.   
Hoping to ride the coattails of the Michigan decision, several 
Kentucky business owners along with the Kentucky Attorney General 
challenged Kentucky Governor Beshear’s declaration of emergency in 
Beshear v. Acree.310  In the November 2020 decision, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court in a lengthy opinion held that Governor Beshear properly 
declared a state of emergency and that his authority to issue executive 
 
renewed by the state legislature.  See Fabick v. Evers, 956 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Wis. 
2021). 
303 In re Certified Questions, 958 N.W.2d at 7. 
304 Id. at 24. 
305 Id. (citations omitted).  The court also listed many of Governor Whitmer’s 
executive orders issued under the EPGA emergency powers including face covering 
mandates, social distancing orders, business capacity restrictions to name a few.  Id. 
at 20–21. 
306 Id. at 17. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 20.  In doing so, the majority found the term “reasonableness” to be 
merely an “illusory limitation upon the Governor’s discretion because the legislature 
is presumed not to delegate the authority to be unreasonable.”  Id. at 22.  Likewise, 
it found the other alleged guiding term “necessary” to be too overbroad to put any 
reasonable constraints on the governor’s actions.  Id. 
309 Id. at 22.  The dissent argues that there are a number of reasonable checks on 
the Governor’s emergency powers under the EPGA such as repealing or amending the 
statute. Id. at 50–51 (McCormick, J., dissenting). 
310 Beshear v. Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780, 786 (Ky. 2020).  In February 2021, the 
Kentucky legislature in an attempt to bypass the Kentucky Supreme Court decision 
passed four bills aimed at vastly limiting the governor’s emergency powers.  See 
Gabriel, supra note 146.  
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orders did not raise issues of separation of powers or violate the 
nondelegation doctrine.311  The court found that Governor Beshear had 
broad executive powers during times of emergency and even if he did not, 
the Legislature properly delegated that authority under the state’s 
emergency disaster statute.312  First, those executive powers come in part 
from the state constitution itself which vests the Governor with “supreme 
executive power of the commonwealth” and providing only the Governor 
with discretion to call a special legislative session for “extraordinary 
occasions.”313  That tilt toward the executive is also underscored by a state 
legislature that meets only part-time.314  Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court noted that the state legislature meets only sixty days per year in even 
numbered years and only thirty days in odd numbered years with sessions 
not extending beyond April 15 and March 30 respectively.315  In closing 
the door on the separation of powers argument, the court found that “the 
structure of Kentucky government as discussed renders it impractical, if 
not impossible, for the legislature, in session for only a short period of time 
each year to have a primary role in steering the Commonwealth through 
an emergency.”316 
Nor do the emergency powers granted to the Governor by Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 39A.010 violate the nondelegation doctrine.317  The Court 
distinguished Acree from the Michigan Supreme Court case In re Certified 
Questions finding that the Kentucky Governor does not have emergency 
powers of unlimited duration nor is the Kentucky legislature continuously 
in session ready to accept responsibility for the emergency.318 
 
311 Beshear, 615 S.W.3d at 786. 
312 Id.  The Kentucky Supreme Court found that Governor Beshear properly 
declared a state of emergency under KRS 39A.010 which includes biological and 
etiological hazards such as the COVID-19 pandemic.  Id. 
313 Id. at 790. 
314 Id. at 807. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 808–09. 
317 Id. at 809. 
318 Id. at 812.  The Kentucky legislature in late March 2020 through S.B. 150 
placed a durational limitation, albeit a weak one, on Governor Beshear’s state of 
emergency.  Id.  S.B. 150 § 3 provided that the Legislative Assembly may declare that 
the emergency no longer exists on the first day of the next session if the Governor has 
not already done so.  Id. at 812–13.  Kentucky’s emergency disaster statute, KY. REV. 
STAT. § 39A.100 does not have any durational limitation.  KY. REV. STAT. § 39A.100.  
Additionally, the Court also held that the Governor was authorized to issue emergency 
executive orders under KY. REV. STAT. § 39A and need not promulgate emergency 
regulations under KY. REV. STAT. § 13A.  Beshear, 615 S.W.3d at 787. 
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V. SAMPLING OF INDIVIDUAL STATE RESPONSES TO COVID-19 
PANDEMIC 
State responses to the pandemic have varied significantly.  Some 
states such as New York have actively approached the pandemic on all 
fronts with the Governor, state legislature and state agencies all taking on 
a role in the process.319  Other states such as Florida have taken a more 
hands-off approach especially toward the latter part of 2020.320 And in 
both Michigan and Wisconsin, the Governors and state legislatures have 
largely been at odds with one another requiring the judiciary to step in on 
multiple occasions to settle the disputes.321  Section IV is divided into four 
subparts where I explain how New York, Florida, Michigan and 
Wisconsin responded during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.   
A. New York 
As one of the primary hot spots early on in the pandemic, then-New 
York Governor Andrew Cuomo quickly declared a state of emergency due 
to COVID-19.322  On March 20, 2020, Governor Cuomo signed the “New 
York State on Pause” executive order which, among other things, required 
all non-essential businesses to close in-office personnel functions, banned 
non-essential social gatherings of any size and included a ninety-day 
moratorium on evictions.323  The Governor stopped short of instituting a 
state-wide stay-at-home order saying that doing so evoked images of 
“shooter situations” or “nuclear war.”324  On April 17, 2020, New York 
was also one of the first states to order a mask mandate.325  On April 26, 
2020, Governor Cuomo announced a phased approach to reopening New 
 
319 See Gabriel, supra note 146. 
320 Plan for Florida’s Recovery, FLORIDA HEALTH, 
https://floridahealthcovid19.gov/plan-for-floridas-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/X8KU-
V6Q3] (last updated May 28, 2021). 
321 See Gabriel, supra note 146. 
322 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8.202 
(2020). 
323 Id.  See also See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2020) (providing 
governor with authority to temporarily suspend laws and issue directives “necessary 
to cope with the disaster”). 
324 Kwame Opam, It’s Not ‘Shelter in Place’: What the New Coronavirus 
Restrictions Mean, N.Y. TIMES (March 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-shelter-in-place-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/YU5G-HEQU].  
325 N.Y. Exec. Order 202.17, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8.202.17 
(April 17, 2020) (ordering that any individual “over age two and able to medically 
tolerate a face-covering shall be required to cover their nose and mouth with a mask 
or cloth face-covering when in a public place and unable to maintain, or when not 
maintaining, social distance”). 
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York industries and businesses.326  The reopening was slow lagging behind 
most of the country though arguably better suited to contain the spread of 
the virus.327  In the fall of 2020, as with most states, New York experienced 
a surge in cases.328  Rather than issuing state-wide closures or lockdowns, 
Governor Cuomo established mitigation measures for “clusters” of 
COVID-19 cases.329  This executive order came about because of certain 
“hot spots” of COVID-19 infection in Kings, Queens, Broome, Orange 
and Rockland counties.330  As discussed in supra Part III, Subpart A:1., 
the United States Supreme Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn 
v. Cuomo found that the executive order, which among other things limited 
the size of indoor gatherings in certain geographical zones, likely violated 
plaintiffs’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause.331 
In July 2020, in an effort to formalize some of Governor Cuomo’s 
executive orders, the New York State Department of Health issued a series 
of COVID-19 temporary emergency regulations concerning face-
coverings, non-essential gatherings and business operations which lasted 
through the state of disaster emergency.332 
As of mid-November 2020, the New York State legislature had 
introduced nearly 500 COVID-19 related bills.333  Among those bills 
enacted, the legislature provided for a moratorium on utility termination 
of services and a COVID-19 public employee death benefit.334  In a most 
 
326 Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo Outlines Phased 
Plan to Re-open New York Starting With Construction and Manufacturing, 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-
cuomo-outlines-phased-plan-re-open-new-york-starting [https://perma.cc/2PNY-
KR4F] (Apr. 26, 2020). 
327 Lazaro Gamio, How Coronavirus Cases Have Risen Since States Have 




329 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.68, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9 § 8.202.68 
(Oct. 6, 2020). 
330 Agudath Isreal of Am. V. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2020). 
331 See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per 
curium). 
332 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10 § 66-3.1-3.5. (2020). For example, 
section 66-3.3 provides that there shall be no non-essential gatherings greater than ten 
individuals for any reason “unless modified by any Executive Order . . . [for] 
implementing the phased reopening of New York businesses and the relaxation of 
social distancing rules by region. Id. § 66-3.3 (emphasis added).  These emergency 
regulations expired on October 6, 2020 and the same emergency regulations were 
reissued on October 7, 2020.  Id. 
333 See State Laws in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, supra 
note 145. 
334 See, e.g., S.B. 08113A, 2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. June 20, 
2020) (concerning a moratorium on utility termination services during the pandemic); 
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unusual move, the New York legislature convened a special session 
between Christmas and the New Year to provide critical economic relief 
to many of its citizens by passing “one of the most comprehensive anti-
eviction laws in the nation.”335  The ban halted current evictions for sixty 
days and  prohibited landlords from initiating most new evictions until 
May 1, 2021.336 
As of December 31, 2020 New York reported a staggering 978,000 
positive COVID-19 cases and 38,000 deaths.337  However, approximately 
31,000 of those deaths came in the first three months of the pandemic.338   
On March 4, 2021 both the New York Times and Wall Street Journal 
reported that some Cuomo administration staff rewrote a report produced 
by the state Department of Health to “conceal the pandemic’s true death 
toll at long-term care facilities.”339  This scandal coupled with recent 
sexual misconduct allegations against Governor Cuomo concerning 
several former female staff members prompted the New York Legislature 
to limit some of the governor’s emergency powers.340 The bill which was 
signed by Governor Cuomo repealed special emergency powers given to 
the governor by the Legislature about a year earlier to respond to the 
pandemic.341  However, the Legislature left in place those emergency 
powers the Governor had prior to the pandemic as well as current 
emergency orders that are still in effect.342 
 
S.B. S8427, 2019-2020, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. May 30, 2020) (providing 
for employee death benefit for those contracting COVID-19 in the workplace). 
335 Dana Rubinstein, New York Bans Most Evictions as Tenants Struggle to Pay 




337 See Ctr. For Sys. Sci. and Eng’g, COVID-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS 
SCH. OF MED. (as of April 28, 2021), 
https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/bda7594740fd40299423467b48
e9ecf6 [https://perma.cc/BUA6-3UFB]. New York has the third highest numbers of 
cases and the most deaths from COVID-19 in the United States.  Id. 
338 Id. 
339 J. David Goodman & Danny Hakim, Cuomo Aides Rewrote Nursing Home 
Report to Hide Higher Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/04/nyregion/cuomo-nursing-home-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/G29X-GRSK] (last updated April 22, 2021); Joe Palazzolo et. al, 
Cuomo Advisers Altered Report on COVID-19 Nursing Home Deaths, WALL ST J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuomo-advisers-altered-report-on-covid-19-nursing-
home-deaths-11614910855 [https://perma.cc/GF2L-UMCX] (Mar. 4, 2021). 
340 Jesse Mckinley & Luis Ferre-Sadurni, Cuomo Faces Revolt as Legislators 
Move to Strip Him of Pandemic Powers, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/nyregion/cuomo-nursing-homes-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RRA-RX7J] (last updated Mar. 5, 2021). 
341 See S.B. S5357, 2021-2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 7, 2021). 
342 See id. 
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New Yorkers overwhelmingly supported Governor Cuomo’s 
management of the COVID-19 pandemic.343 Governor Cuomo had a 70% 
approval in April 2020 compared to a national average of 64%, and an 
approval rating of 53% in February 2021 with a national average of 
46%.344  Even after Governor Cuomo was plagued by a sexual assault 
scandal and the New York State Legislature repealed some of his 
emergency powers, 64% of New York democrats said that Cuomo has 
done a good job providing information during the pandemic.345 
B. Florida 
Florida’s Governor similarly declared a state of emergency 
concerning COVID-19 early in March, 2020.346 Taking a different 
approach than New York, on March 15, 2021, Governor DeSantis barred 
visitation to nursing homes and set up “Covid-dedicated” health wards for 
seniors testing positive for COVID and who could not be properly isolated 
in their current facility.347  Between March 17th and March 31st, the 
Governor issued a number of executive orders designed to curb the spread 
of COVID-19 including, among others, limiting restaurant capacity and 
banning non-emergency medical procedures.348  And on April 1, 2020, the 
 
343 David Lazer et al., The State of the Nation: a 50-State COVID-19 Survey, 
Report #22 Executive Approval Update, THE COVID-19 CONSORTIUM FOR 
UNDERSTANDING THE PUB.’S POL’Y PREFERENCES ACROSS STATES (March 2021). 
344 Id. 
345 Nate Cohn, Governor’s Approval Rating Has Fallen.  He Could Still Win 
Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, (April 24, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/upshot/andrew-cuomo-polls-governor.html 
[https://perma.cc/XB5W-WJZC]. 
346 Both a public health emergency and a state of emergency was declared in 
Florida.  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-51 (March 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-51.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7HM-RVER] 
(ordering state health officer to declare public health emergency); FLA. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, Declaration of Public Health Emergency, (March 1, 2020), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-51.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L7HM-RVER] (declaring public health emergency due to COVID-
19); Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52 (March 9, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-52.pdf (declaring a state of emergency under 
Chapter 252 of the Florida Statutes) [https://perma.cc/6ZQF-F9AL]. 
347 Allysia Finley, Vindication for Ron DeSantis, WALL. ST. J., (Mar. 2, 2021), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/vindication-for-ron-desantis-11614986751 
[https://perma.cc/97L4-HDWC]. 
348 See Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-68 (March 17, 2020), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-68.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8H3N-8GCB] (limiting capacity at restaurants and beaches); Fla. 
Exec. Order No. 20-72 (March 20, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-72.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS3V-5KTL] 
(prohibiting “medically unnecessary, non-urgent or non-emergency procedures or 
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Governor issued a stay-at-home order and said all persons in Florida 
should limit their activities to obtaining or providing essential services.349  
Governor Desantis’ efforts to curb COVID-19 transmission were 
short-lived.350  He lifted the stay-at-home order only four weeks later on 
April 29, 2020, but with limitations as most of Florida entered phase one 
of Florida’s reopening plan.351  Florida was not an initial hot spot, but it 
opened up its economy more quickly than other states. In July 2020, just 
after the Governor allowed retail establishments, museums and gyms 
among other businesses to operate at full capacity, Florida experienced a 
surge in COVID-19 cases and reported the country’s highest single-day 
record at the time for positive tests at 15,299.352  While still in the midst of 
the summer surge, Governor DeSantis issued Executive Order 20-244 
providing that all of Florida enter phase three of its reopening plan.353  In 
an unusual move, the Governor removed all capacity and other restrictions 
 
surgery; Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-82 (March 24, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-82.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBK7-BXNG] 
(directing “[a]ll persons who enter Florida from an area with substantial community 
spread… to isolate and quarantine for a period of 14 days…”); Fla. Exec. Order No. 
20-87 (March 27, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TAF-4KXB] 
(prohibiting short-terms vacation rentals); Fla. Exec. Order 20-90 (March 31, 2020), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-90.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NH2-HX6D] (closing beaches in Broward and Palm Beach 
County). 
349 Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-91 (April 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-91-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W8C-
VDHD]. 
350 See Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-112 (April 29, 2020), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-112.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UF6X-DJ3V]. 
351 Id.  Broward, West-Palm and Miami-Dade Counties did not enter phase one 
on this date.  Governor says phase 1 of reopening can begin May 4: What that means 




MSZM].  Governor Desantis’ reopening plan titled “Safe. Smart. Step-by-Step” is a 
three phased plan. Re-open Florida Task Force, Safe. Smart. Step-by-Step. Plan for 
Florida’s Recovery, FL. GOV., https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/covid19/Taskforce%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N53-M7PL]. 
352 See Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-139 (June 3, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-139.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDW7-X25H]; 
Tamara Lush & Terry Spencer, Florida Reports Largest Single-Day Increase in 
COVID Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 12, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-
outbreak-health-statistics-health-us-news-ap-top-news-
798f9aab3bb2e5fbf733413a99476d7c [https://perma.cc/JD9D-7C59]. 
353 Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-244 (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-244.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QEE-VVT9]. 
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on businesses and suspended all fines concerning COVID-19.354  In other 
words, individuals and businesses could not be penalized if they violated 
any COVID-19 restrictions in the state. While some city and local 
governments may have had certain restrictions in place such as capacity 
restrictions or a local mask mandate, they were powerless to enforce them.  
Some Florida counties were not even permitted to maintain some of their 
local COVID-19 orders.  For example, restaurant and bar owners brought 
suit against Broward County for ordering that these establishments could 
not serve between midnight and 5 a.m.355 The federal district court held 
that Broward County’s order was preempted by Governor DeSantis’ 
recent order effectively reopening all Florida businesses.356 The Florida 
Governor has not issued nor has plans to issue a state-wide mask mandate 
though a few local counties have mandates.357  However, since Executive 
Order 20-244 suspends the collection of fines associated with COVID-19, 
any local mask mandate is essentially unenforceable.358   
By the end of 2020, the Florida state legislature had not passed any 
legislation designed to either curb the transmission of COVID-19 or to 
provide economic relief to its citizens due to the pandemic.359  As of 
December 31, 2020, Florida reported approximately 1.3 million positive 
COVID-19 cases and 21,700 deaths.360  Florida had the third highest 
number of reported positive cases and the fourth highest number of 
COVID-19 fatalities.361 
During 2020, Florida citizens have largely disapproved of Governor 
DeSantis’ handling of the pandemic.  His approval rating was just 46% in 
April 2020, which was significantly below the 64% average for approval 
for Governors at that time.  It further declined to 40% in October 2020 
which is 8% below the average for other Governors in October.362  Even 
 
354 Id. 
355 828 Management LLC v. Broward Cty, No. 20-62166-CIV-SINGHAL, 2020 
WL 7635169, at *1, 2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2020). 
356 Id. at *7. 
357 Greg Allen, Florida’s Governor: Officials Can Require Face Masks, But 





359 As of mid-November 2020, the Florida state legislature passed one bill which 
declared the Florida State Seminoles the NCAA champions upon default as the NCAA 
tournament was canceled due to COVID-19 concerns.  S.R. 1934, 2020 Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2020). 
360 See COVID-19 Dashboard, supra note 337. 
361 Id. California and Texas reported higher positive cases and only New York, 
California and Texas recorded higher total fatalities.  Id. 
362 See Lazer, supra note 343. 
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as recently as February 2021, DeSantis’ approval hit a pandemic low of 
35%, more than 11% below the national average.363  However, in March 
2021, Governor DeSantis was praised by some for his handling of the 
pandemic, particularly his approach in managing long term care facilities 
during the early part of the crisis.364  He has also been commended for 
reopening the Florida economy more quickly than other states.365 Still, 
others argue that Governor DeSantis did not necessarily manage the 
pandemic well but rather Florida’s weather and less densely populated 
areas may have reduced the spread of the virus.366 
C. Michigan 
As discussed in supra Part III, on March 10, 2020, Michigan 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer declared a state of emergency under two 
separate emergency statutes – the Emergency Management Act of 1976 
(“EMA”) and the Emergency Powers of the Governor’s Act of 1945 
(“EPGA”).367  The Governor shortly thereafter ordered that gatherings 
greater than 250 persons were prohibited and schools were to close on 
March 16.368  Five days later, Governor Whitmer ordered Michigan 
residents to stay at home.369  Within three weeks of the Governor’s initial 
emergency declaration, there were nearly 10,000 COVID-19 cases and 
337 deaths in the state.370  On April 1, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued 
Executive order 2020-33 which expanded her initial emergency 
declaration.371  The Michigan Legislature through Concurrent Senate 
Resolution 24 approved and extended Governor Whitmer’s emergency 
 
363 Id. 
364 Finley, supra note 347. 
365 Id. 
366 Souma Karlamangla & Rong-Gong Lin II, California vs. Florida: Who 
Handled COVID-19 Better, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2021), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-03-09/florida-vs-california-who-had-
better-covid-response [https://perma.cc/85VP-24GJ]. 
367 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-04, (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-521576--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/79MU-JXGP]. 
368 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-05, (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-521595--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/XH45-7NU4]. 
369 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-21, (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522626--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/EU4K-AZ4R]. 
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declaration until April 30, 2020.372  On April 30, Governor Whitmer issued 
Executive Order 2020-66 which terminated her previous declarations of 
emergency and then issued Executive Orders 2020-67 and 2020-68 where 
she redeclared a state of emergency concerning COVID-19 under both the 
EPGA and EMA respectively.373 She did so without legislative approval. 
The Michigan Legislature instead sought to proceed without renewing the 
state of emergency by passing Senate Bill 858, which sought to limit the 
Governor’s initial emergency declaration to fourteen days before needing 
legislative approval to extend.374  Senate Bill 858 also sought to lift the 
stay-at-home order while introducing social distancing measures and 
cleaning protocols for opened businesses.375   
On May 4, 2020, the Governor introduced the state’s reopening plan 
but did not lift the stay-at-home order until June.376  On May 6, the 
Michigan state legislature leadership brought suit against Whitmer for 
exceeding her authority under both the EPGA and EMA and the next day 
Governor Whitmer vetoed Senate Bill 858.377  On May 22, 2020, Governor 
Whitmer rescinded her previous declarations of emergencies under both 
the EPGA and EMA and reissued those emergency declarations to reflect 
the ongoing nature of litigation concerning her authority to issue them.378  
In the summer of 2020, most Michigan regions entered phase four of the 
Michigan Safe Start Plan which allowed for some small non-essential 
 




373 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-67 (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-527717--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/86BP-23RY]. 




376 See MI Safe Start, MICHIGAN.GOV (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/whitmer/MI_SAFE_START_PLAN_689875
_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8JX-LNA3]; Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-110, (June 1, 
2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-530620--
,00.html [https://perma.cc/3KLA-QPZD]. 
377 Whitmer Vetoes Bill that Would Have Reopened Some Businesses Sooner, 
MLIVE (May 5, 2020), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2020/05/whitmer-
vetoes-bill-that-would-have-reopened-some-businesses-sooner.html 
[https://perma.cc/R8YU-7R3A]. 
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gatherings and lower risk businesses to reopen.379  On July 13, 2020, the 
Governor issued an order requiring all individuals who leave their home 
to wear a mask.380  
As discussed more fully in supra Part III.B, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in In re Certified Questions found that neither the emergency 
declaration under the EMA nor the one under the EPGA were valid and 
enforceable.381 And on October 12, 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that Governor Whitmer’s emergency orders had no effect and urged 
the Governor and state legislature to work together.382 
With all of the Governor’s emergency executive orders rescinded, 
both Michigan state agencies and the state legislature engaged in a flurry 
of activity to provide some of the basic protections for its citizens that were 
no longer covered.  On October 5, 2020, the director of the Michigan 
Department of Health and Human Services issued an “Emergency Order 
Under MCL 333.2252 – Gathering Prohibition and Mask Order.”383  This 
public health order was to replace the Governor’s most recent executive 
order on face coverings and gatherings.384  On October 15, 2020, the 
Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity promulgated 
emergency rules that clarified that Workers’ Compensation coverage for 
first responders who test positive for COVID-19 is presumed, replacing 
previous coverage provided under executive order 2020-128.385  The state 
 
379 Id. Phase Five allows for larger gathering sizes and for most businesses to 
reopen. Id. 
380 See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-147, (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-534169--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/XP2J-2KDC]. A face mask bill was introduced in Michigan House 
on August 6, 2020 and as of the date of this article remains in the Committee on Health 
Policy. See H.B. 6099, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020) (in committee Aug. 12, 
2020). 
381 See In re Certified Questions, 958 N.W.2d 1, 31 (Mich. 2020). 
382 In re Certified Questions, 949 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. 2020) (denying motion to 
stay precedential effect of Oct. 2, 2020 decision). 
383 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, Emergency Order Under MCL 333.2253 




384 Id. This order replaces three of the Governor’s executive orders: 2020-153, 
2020-160 and 2020-161. Id. 
385 MICH. DEP’T OF LABOR & ECON. OPPORTUNITY, Worker’s Disability 
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legislature stepped in with several bills to codify previous executive orders 
with the Governor, signing six of them as of early November, 2020.386   
The Michigan State Legislature introduced nearly 200 COVID-19 
related bills and resolutions.387 Most of the legislative action occurred after 
the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that Michigan was no longer 
under a state of emergency.388   
As of December 31, 2020, Michigan had reported 528,600 positive 
COVID-19 cases and 13,000 deaths.389  Governor Whitmer has received 
high approval ratings for her handling of the pandemic with a 62% 
approval rating in April, a 56% approval rating in October 2020 and a 52% 
rating in February 2021, all exceeding the national average.390 
In early April 2021, as most of the United States saw a decrease in 
COVID-19 cases, Michigan experienced a significant surge where it was 
reporting over 7,000 infections per day – a seven fold increase from 
February 2021.391  Going against health official recommendations, 
Governor Whitmer did not issue any stay-at-home orders or close down 
any businesses.392  Recognizing that Michigan citizens suffered from 
pandemic fatigue, she asked that citizens take a two-week pause from in-
person dining, high school and sports.393  As of May 1, 2021, Michigan’s 
two week positive case average decreased by 46% to about 4600 new cases 
per day.394 
 
386 These new laws include adding requirements for nursing home with COVID-
19 residents, allowing certain licensed health professionals to administer COVID-19 
testing and amending the probate law to allow for some electronic records and 
signatures.  H.B. 6137, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Mich. 2020), H.B. 6293, 100th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); H.B. 2694, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Mich. 2020). 
387 See State Laws in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, supra 
note 145. 
388 See, e.g., H.B. 5911, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020), 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/publicact/pdf/2020-PA-
0147.pdf [https://perma.cc/96LJ-F67P]; see also In re Certified Questions of the 
United States District Court, 949 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. 2020). 
389 See COVID-19 Dashboard, supra note 337. 
390 See Lazer, supra note 343. 
391 Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Michigan’s Virus Cases are out of Control, 
Putting Gov. Gretchen Whitmer in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/10/us/coronavirus-michigan-gretchen-
whitmer.html [https://perma.cc/GY89-W3FL] (April 10, 2021).  The surge is likely a 
result of a more contagious variant spreading throughout the state coupled with a 
significant increase in in-person gatherings.  Id. 
392 Id. 
393 Id. 
394 Tracking Coronavirus in Michigan: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/michigan-covid-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/XXU3-T9DU] (as of May 1, 2021). 
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  D. Wisconsin 
On March 12, 2020, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers declared a 
public health emergency which was due to expire in sixty days unless 
extended by the legislature.395  On March 24, 2020, the Secretary of Health 
ordered residents to stay at home in accordance with the Governor’s public 
health emergency declaration and Wis. Stat. section 252.02(3), also known 
as the Safer at Home Order.396  About two weeks before the public health 
emergency was set to expire, the Secretary of Health reissued the Safer at 
Home Order but solely under Wis. Stat. section 252.02(3) and not under 
the Governor’s emergency declaration.397  This new order had the effect 
of bypassing the need for a legislative resolution to extend the public 
health emergency.398  As described more fully in supra Part III.B, the Safer 
at Home Order was declared unenforceable by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court on May 13, 2020, effectively reopening the entire Wisconsin 
economy.399  Notwithstanding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rulings, 
Governor Evers continued renewing the state of emergency and both Evers 
and Secretary Palm continued to issue orders in an effort to curb 
transmission of the virus.400  For example, on August 1, 2020, Governor 
Evers ordered that face coverings required in indoor spaces rather than in 
a private residence.401  Secretary Palm was not as successful when she 
 
395 Wis. Exec. Order No. 72 (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO/EO072-DeclaringHealthEmergencyCOVID-
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ETM-RL9C]. 
396 Wis. Exec. Order No. 12 (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO12-SaferAtHome.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HL3W-RKH9]. 
397 Wis. Exec. Order No. 28 (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO28-SaferAtHome.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XKA7-E3TA]. 
398 Id. On April 27 and May 11, the Wisconsin Secretary of Health issued two 
additional orders slowly reopening the economy which allowed among other things 
retail and drive-in theaters to open with restrictions.  See Wis. Exec. Order No. 34 
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO34-
SAHDialTurn.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW9N-BHB]; Wis. Exec. Order No. 36 (May 11, 
2020), https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO36-SAHDialTurn2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5M5E-5JLH]. 
398 Id. On April 20, the Secretary of Health through emergency order 31 
announced the three-phased approach toward opening Wisconsin’s economy.  Palm, 
942 N.W.2d at 918. 
399 Id. 
400 See, e.g., infra notes 401-03. 
401 Wis. Gov. Emergency Order No. 1 (Aug. 1, 2020), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EmO01-FaceCoverings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3DT8-ALSL].  The mask mandate initially withstood legal 
challenge.  See Lindoo v. Evers, No. 20 CV 219 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2020). 
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issued Emergency Order #3 limiting public gatherings in early October, as 
a Wisconsin appellate court enjoined enforcement of the order.402  On 
November 10, 2020, Governor Evers – not the Secretary of Health – issued 
Executive Order #94 titled “Relating to Actions Every Wisconsinite 
Should Take to Protect their Family, Friends, and Neighbors from 
COVID-19.”403  This advisory recommends that all Wisconsinites should 
stay home as much as possible due to the surge of COVID-19 positive 
cases in the state.  There is no penalty for failing to comply with this 
advisory.404 
In late January 2021, Governor Evers had only a few COVID-19 
restrictions in place including the state-wide mask mandate.405  Looking to 
repeal the mask mandate, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Concurrent 
Resolution No. 3 which stated that Governor Evers had no authority to 
renew the state of emergency due to COVID-19 and that even if he did, 
the Legislature was using its authority to terminate the emergency 
declaration by concurrent resolution.406  This had the effect of ending all 
of the Governor’s executive orders including the mask-mandate order.407 
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s resolution terminating the emergency 
declaration, Governor Evers issued a new emergency declaration and a 
new mask mandate.408  On March 31, 2021, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
 
402 Wis. Gov. & Sec. Emergency Order No. 3 (Oct. 6, 2020), 
https://www.wpr.org/sites/default/files/emo_3_limiting_public_gatherings_signed.p
df [https://perma.cc/7Y65-QL5K]. The Secretary of Health stated that the emergency 
order was issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
decision in Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2020). Memorandum in 
Support of Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction Pending Appeal, Tavern 
League of Wis., Inc. v. Palm, No. 2020CV128 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2020) (No. 
2020CV128) (available at https://greatlakeslegalfoundation.org/wwcms/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/Tavern-League-of-WI-v-Palm_Memo-ISO-Injunction-
Pending-Appeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W9A-7GBM]).  




405 Wis. Exec. Order No. 104 (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO/EO104-
DeclaringPublicHealthEmergencyJan2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3HD-M8VK]; 
Wis. Gov. Emergency Order No. 1 (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EmO01-JanFaceCoverings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/URF8-VCZ6] (relating to the stopping of the spread of highly 
contagious variant by the requiring of face coverings). 
406 S. Con. Res. 3, 2021-2022, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021). 
407 Id. 
408 Wis. Exec. Order No. 105 (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO/EO105-PHE.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8PE-3EG3]; 
Wis. Gov. Emergency Order No. 1 (Feb. 4, 2021), 
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in Fabick v. Evers held that Governor Evers exceeded his authority under 
the state’s emergency disaster statute for reissuing multiple states of 
emergency due to COVID-19 when the statutory duration for a state of 
emergency was sixty days unless extended by the Legislature.409 Like 
Michigan, Wisconsin no longer has a state of emergency due to COVID-
19.410 
As of November 16, 2020, the Republican controlled state legislature 
had passed only one bill related to the COVID-19 pandemic.411  Governor 
Evers and the Secretary of Health’s lack of authority to issue community 
mitigation measures has taken a toll on the state.  As the New York Times 
reported in early November 2020, COVID-19 cases have surged all across 
the country “but nowhere as quickly as Wisconsin.”412  In the first week of 
November, Wisconsin reported over 6,000 cases per day.413  The fall surge 
was attributed in part to the party line division within the state on how to 
manage the pandemic.414  As of December 31, 2020, Wisconsin reported 
520,400 cases of COVID-19 and 5,200 deaths from the disease.415 
Governor Evers’s approval rating steadily declined from a high of 56% in 
April to 41% in October, but jumped to a high of 54% in February 2021 
as he fought to maintain the state of emergency and the state’s mask 
mandate.416 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With a surge in cases at the time of this article’s submission in March 
2021, state governors continued to issue executive orders aimed at curbing 




409 956 N.W.2d 856, 869–80 (Wis. 2021). 
410 As of May 1, 2021, only Alaska, Wisconsin and Michigan did not have a 
current COVID-19 state of emergency.  See COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing 
Plans, supra note 11. 
411 See 2019 WIS. ACT 185 (enacted Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2019/related/acts/185.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQM3-
BV27].  
412 Mitch Smith et. al., What Places are Hardest Hit by the Coronavirus? It 




414 Robinson Meyer, Wisconsin is on the Brink of a Major Outbreak, THE 
ATLANTIC, (Sept. 26, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/09/wisconsin-coronavirus-
hotspot/616510/ [https://perma.cc/2GZG-VQM2]. 
415 See COVID-19 Dashboard, supra note 337. 
416 See Lazer, supra note 343. 
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impacts this pandemic has had on their state’s economy.417  These orders 
have not been uniformly welcomed with open arms.418  Individuals, 
businesses, and religious organizations have protested in the streets against 
some of the most restrictive social distancing orders and have challenged 
them in the courts.419  Therefore, subpart A evaluates whether there are 
sufficient checks in place on the state executive or if some of those checks 
are too burdensome on governors.  Next, subpart B examines how both 
governors and litigants can learn from prior cases to better craft executive 
orders that may avoid some of the constitutional pitfalls.  And finally, 
subpart C looks at how the state legislature or various state agencies could 
undertake a more active role by enacting emergency statutes or regulations 
concerning COVID-19. 
A. Checks on Governor’s Emergency Executive Order Authority 
While the United States saw an unprecedented number of executive 
orders issued by state governors, its citizens can be reasonably assured that 
there are enough checks in place against a governor that may have 
overstepped her bounds.  First, a majority of state legislatures can 
terminate their governor’s declaration of emergency at any time through a 
concurrent resolution.420  If the state legislature terminated the emergency 
declaration, it also terminates the governor’s authority to issue executive 
orders in accordance with the emergency.421  Second, the judiciary is 
providing meaningful review of challenges to executive orders particularly 
where the order concerns potential civil rights violations.422 
1. Legislative Oversight and Statutory Limits 
Typically, state legislatures have some oversight or ability to limit a 
governor who oversteps her authority when issuing emergency orders.423  
However, some statutory guardrails are better than others.  Perhaps the 
most balanced form of check on the governor’s emergency powers is the 
state legislature’s authority to terminate the state of emergency by 
concurrent resolution.  Indeed, about thirty-three state legislatures can 
terminate a governor’s declaration of emergency and all of the emergency 
 
417 See supra Part II. 
418 Id. 
419 See supra Part III. 
420 See infra Appendix A. 
421 See supra Part III. 
422 Id. 
423 See infra Appendix A. 
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powers that come with it.424  A joint resolution terminating an emergency 
would not be a power likely wielded often as a majority of the state 
legislature would be needed for its passage.425  The joint resolution may 
need to be presented to the governor for her signature.426  Only a few state 
legislatures such as the Kansas and Pennsylvania state legislatures have 
attempted to terminate their governor’s emergency declaration through 
legislative resolution but failed either because the resolution was not 
presented for the governor’s signature or because it failed to follow proper 
procedures.427  And it may have been for the best as Kansas and 
Pennsylvania each have an active state of emergency.428  In contrast, in 
January 2021, the Wisconsin legislature by concurrent resolution 
terminated Governor Evers current COVID-19 emergency declaration,  
only to have Governor Evers reissue a new emergency declaration.429  
While Governor Evers’ intent was to bypass the statutory guardrail 
 
424 Id.  I use the term state legislature to refer to the fifty U.S. states as well as to 
the District of Columbia and the U.S. territories. 
425 See infra notes 427, 429 (explaining that only the Kansas, Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin state legislatures passed a legislative resolution to end the state of 
emergency). 
426 See, e.g., Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d at 707 (finding that the legislature must 
present the concurrent resolution terminating the state of emergency to the governor).  
An additional argument could be made that a state legislature cannot use a concurrent 
resolution to end the emergency without presenting it to the governor for signature or 
veto since executive orders have the full force of law.  See Gen. Assemb. of State of 
N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982) (finding broad legislative veto provision in 
New Jersey Legislative Oversight Act violated separation of powers doctrine by 
usurping Governor’s authority under the Presentment Clause of State Constitution). 
427 See Titus Wu, Kansas Lawmakers Discuss Ending COVID-19 Emergency, 
Attempt Override on Last Day of Work, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL (May 26, 2021), 
https://www.cjonline.com/story/news/politics/government/2021/05/26/kansas-
lawmakers-end-covid-19-emergency-override-more-vetoes-sine-die-laura-kelly-ty-
masterson/7447412002/ [https://perma.cc/H325-Y6RE]; see also Harri Leigh, Pa. 
Legislature Moves to End the Governor’s Emergency Disaster Declaration, FOX43 
(May 25, 2021), https://www.fox43.com/article/news/politics/pa-legislature-end-
governors-emergency-disaster-declaration/521-2cc00848-336e-43b3-b847-
e07044196e7b [https://perma.cc/5R8E-53QG]; Kelly v. Legis. Coordinating Council, 
460 P.3d 832 (Kan. 2020).  In March 2021, the Kansas state legislature amended the 
state’s emergency disaster statute to provide greater powers to a legislative 
coordinating council. See S.B. 40, 2020-2021 Leg. Sess. (Ka. 2021).  That council 
consisting of state legislative leadership will now be needed to approve any future 
emergency orders issued by the governor.  Id. 
428 COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans, supra note 11. 
429 Wis. Exec. Order No. 105 (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO/EO105-PHE.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY4X-
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provided by the state’s emergency disaster statute, he was ultimately 
unsuccessful.430  For the approximately twenty states or U.S. territories 
without this type of statutory guardrail, their respective emergency disaster 
statutes or state constitutions should be amended to include one.431   
Most state emergency disaster statutes provide for an emergency 
declaration of a limited duration such as thirty, sixty, or ninety days.432  
Yet a number of these state statutes do not specify who may extend the 
state of emergency.  Some states vest the power to renew with the 
governor.433  Unlike an open-ended emergency declaration, these 
emergency disaster statutes with durational limits provide for some type 
of regular review of the need for the emergency but that review likely rests 
with the executive and would not be a check on her power.434 
Instead of the power to terminate a declaration of emergency, about 
seven state legislatures are vested with the power to renew a governor’s 
state of emergency after a certain period of time.435  It seems as this is not 
so much a limit on the governor’s power but rather requires active 
participation by the state legislature in the emergency power process and 
goes too far in times of emergency.  Since state legislatures are known to 
be sluggish, this process can lead to inaction and the inability to come 
together resulting in an expired emergency declaration even though the 
need to continue the emergency is still pressing.  Also, this provision can 
be used for political purposes to thwart activity of the governor from the 
opposing party.  Michigan and Wisconsin are two cases in point.  
Governor Whitmer, a Democratic governor, sidestepped the state 
emergency statute’s requirement that she request the legislature’s approval 
to continue the state of emergency past twenty-eight days knowing she 
would be thwarted by a predominantly Republican legislature.436  With the 
Michigan Supreme Court holding that she did not comply with the statute, 
her initial emergency declaration expired leaving her without any 
emergency powers amidst an ongoing crisis.437  The Democratic 
Wisconsin Governor, Tony Evers, likewise had his Secretary of Health 
issue a stay-at-home order under a specific Wisconsin Statute rather than 
 
430 Fabick v. Evers, 956 N.W.2d 856, 869–70 (Wis. 2021).  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that Evers did not have authority to reissue the COVID-19 
emergency declarations as the statute only provides for a state of emergency to last for 
sixty days unless extended by the legislature. Id. at 868–70. 




435 Id.  Those seven states are Alaska, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. 
436 See generally supra Part IV.C. 
437 In re Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 958 
N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Mich. 2020). 
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under his public health emergency declaration as that declaration was set 
to expire in May and he needed the concurrent resolution of the 
Republican led legislature to extend the emergency.438  As with Michigan, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court intervened in the dispute between the 
executive and legislative branches holding that the Secretary of Health 
exceeded her authority and declared the stay-at-home order invalid and 
unenforceable.439  In March 2021, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
Governor Evers did not have the authority to declare a state of emergency 
in response to COVID-19 once the sixty day durational limitation 
expired.440  Like Michigan, Wisconsin was no longer in a state of 
emergency as the legislature did not seek to extend it.441   
In contrast, during the worst of the pandemic in Pennsylvania, the 
state legislature did not have the authority to extend an emergency 
declaration.442  The Legislature was limited to terminating a state of 
emergency by legislative concurrent resolution that also must be presented 
to the governor for signature or veto.443  While the Pennsylvania state 
legislature adopted a concurrent resolution to end the COVID-19 state of 
emergency, Governor Wolf vetoed that resolution, and the state assembly 
did not have the two third majority votes necessary to override the veto.444  
This is the democratic process at work.445 
However, some may argue that the state legislature’s power in many 
of these emergency disaster statutes gives it little flexibility – it is an all or 
nothing approach.  New York may have a better solution.  In New York, 
the state legislature had both the authority to terminate a state of 
emergency as well as the authority to terminate a specific emergency 
executive order.446 If the state legislature finds that the governor 
overstepped his authority in issuing a particular order, it may by 
concurrent resolution terminate that specific order rather than the entire 
state of emergency.447   
 
438 See generally supra Part IV.D. 
439 See Wis. Legislature. v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 906–07 (Wis. 2020). 
440 Fabick v. Evers, 956 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Wis. 2021). 
441 Id. 
442 See infra Appendix A. 
443 Id. 
444 H.R. 836, Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Pa. 2020) (vetoed). 
445 Pennsylvania citizens voted in May to limit the Governor’s declaration of 
emergency to twenty-one days unless renewed by legislature. Hannah Brandt, PA 




446 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20-A(4). 
447 Id. 
61
Deere: Governing by Executive Order During the Covid-19 Pandemic: Prelim
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
782 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
In Kentucky, the state legislature went beyond giving itself the power 
to terminate a resolution or state of emergency: it passed legislation to strip 
certain emergency powers from its governor.448  Rather than providing for 
a check on the governor’s emergency powers with respect to closing 
certain businesses to curb transmission of COVID-19, it usurped those 
powers by allowing for businesses, schools and associations to remain 
open as long as their plan meets or exceeds CDC guidance.449  It took away 
the Governor’s ability to protect its citizens from the ongoing pandemic 
when closing businesses in response to a highly transmissible variant may 
be necessary notwithstanding compliance with CDC guidance.  And, it is 
shocking that this part-time legislature that meets either thirty or sixty days 
per year is required to extend any emergency executive order concerning 
in-person meetings.450  For a state legislature whose state constitution 
dictates that it is not to be in session beyond April in any given year, the 
general assembly cannot feasibly renew executive orders expiring in the 
summer or fall.451  If a court does not declare this legislation 
unconstitutional, the Governor will be powerless to employ certain 
mitigation measures should the need arise, and the part-time state 
legislature may not be in session to take over for the executive. 
Some state legislatures may need to do some statutory cleanup to 
better integrate their public health statutory scheme with their overall 
emergency disaster statutory framework.  For a number of states, the 
governors declared both a public health emergency and a general state of 
emergency.452  For those states, their public health emergency statute may 
not provide their governor with sufficient emergency powers to respond 
to the virus.453  Instead of declaring both types of emergencies, governors 
should have an option to use their full range of emergency powers when 
confronting a public health emergency.  That option should come with the 
same set of statutory guardrails as with the emergency disaster statute.  For 
other states, such as Wisconsin, the governor was provided with little 
emergency powers but instead was ordered to direct the Secretary of 
 
448 See H.B. 1, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (allowing businesses, schools and 
associations to remain open if their plan meets or exceeds current CDC guidance); 
H.B. 5, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (limiting the authority of governor to temporarily 
reorganize administrative agencies without legislative approval); S.B. 1, 2021 Reg. 
Sess. (Ky. 2021) (limiting executive orders concerning in-person meetings to thirty 
days unless extended by legislature); S.B. 2, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (requiring 
state agencies to submit documentation to legislative subcommittee before issuing 
emergency regulations). 
449 See Ky. H.B. 1. 
450 See Ky. S.B. 1. 
451 KY. CONST. § 42. 
452 See infra Appendix A. 
453 Id. 
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Health to respond to the emergency.454  No doubt state legislatures will 
also need to contemplate long term reform of their public health 
emergency statutory framework.  One legal scholar has proposed statutory 
reform to codify the law of social distancing.455  As with recent public 
health emergency reform, this change may be necessary, but it will not 
come easy.  In the meantime, for those few states that do not have a 
statutory check on their governor’s emergency powers, it may be time for 
those state legislatures to put one in place.456 
2. Sufficient Judicial Review  
Early on in the pandemic, some legal scholars raised serious concerns 
about whether the courts would meaningfully review a constitutional 
challenge to a governor’s executive order.457  And these concerns were 
certainly justified at the time.  As discussed in supra Part III, Subpart A, a 
number of federal district courts in Spring 2020 applied the century old 
case Jacobson v. Massachusetts finding that they must afford more 
deferential review to government restrictions concerning COVID-19.458  
In other words, a number of these courts swapped out traditional 
constitutional analysis for a more deferential standard during this time of 
emergency.459  However, the majority opinion in the recent Supreme Court 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo does not even cite to 
Jacobson.460  It appears likely the Jacobson framework is no longer the 
standard of review in pandemic cases.461  The more difficult question is 
whether courts may still rely on Jacobson but to a lesser degree.  Indeed, 
at least two federal district courts post-Roman Catholic Diocese confirmed 
 
454 See Wis. Exec. Order No. 72, supra note 395. 
455 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 60–68.  Professor Wiley argues that the 
legislature should begin to codify the law of social distancing and mask requirements.  
Id.  Wiley broadly proposes state legislative reform concerning a governor’s 
emergency powers should encompass four general principles: 1) the strategic and 
scientific purpose of the order; 2) a graded range of intervention and classification 
among businesses and activities, 3) Neutral laws of general applicability; and 4) 
supportive measures should be put in place.  Id. at 59. 
456 Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and 
Wyoming currently do not have any statutory limits on the Governor’s authority to 
declare and/or extend a state of emergency. See infra Appendix A. 
457 Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 154, at 187 (finding that the “coronavirus 
pandemic serves to undermine defenses of the ‘suspension’ model grounded in the 
putatively transitory nature of emergencies.”). 
458 See generally supra Part III.A and accompanying cases. 
459 Id. 
460 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020). 
461 See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-cv-773-MC, 2020 WL 
2542861, at *2 (D. Or. May 19, 2020). 
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that Jacobson is binding precedent until the U.S. Supreme Court or federal 
appellate court tells them otherwise.462  While the law remains far from 
settled, most decisions fall along a spectrum in how they integrate the 
Jacobson framework to the challenged orders.  At one end of the spectrum, 
some courts applied Jacobson rigidly providing a highly deferential 
review of the governor’s executive orders.463  While some courts embraced 
this standard early on in the pandemic, fewer courts since May 2020 have 
applied so rigid a standard.464  At the other end of the spectrum, a few 
courts – most notably the December 2020 Second Circuit decision in 
Agudath Israel v. Cuomo – specifically rejected Jacobson as the standard 
of review.465  Other courts fell somewhere in between.  For those judges 
more inclined to integrate Jacobson into their decision, they reviewed the 
executive order using the Jacobson two element test but apply traditional 
constitutional analysis to the second element.466  For other judges, 
Jacobson is more of a lens by which to apply traditional constitutional 
analysis.467  Even for those courts that lean more heavily on Jacobson, an 
executive order will not be enforced when the evidence clearly shows that 
it does not substantially support the government’s interest.468   
As the battle lines have been drawn between Democratic governors 
and Republican led state legislatures in Pennsylvania, Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Kansas over how best to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, 
 
462 See Delaney v. Baker, No. 20-11154-WGY, 2021 WL 42340, at *11 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 6, 2021) (concerning challenge to Executive Order mandating wearing of 
face masks in public); M. Rae, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 1:20-CV-2366, 2020 WL 7642596, 
at *6, 11 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2020) (concerning challenge to executive order banning 
indoor dining). 
463 M. Rae, Inc., 2020 WL 7642596, at *6. 
464 See Agudath Israel v. Cuomo, No. 20-3572, 2020 WL 7691715, at *9 (2d 
Cir. Dec. 28, 2020). 
465 Id. 
466 See, e.g., In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1029–30 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying 
Casey undue burdens test to Jacobson second element in finding executive order 
restricting abortions not likely a violation of right to abortion); Carmichael v. Ige, 470 
F.Supp.3d 1133, 1146–47 (D. Haw. 2020) (applying traditional constitutional analysis 
in Jacobson second element in finding that executive order requiring 14-day 
quarantine did not violate right to travel.). 
467 See Farber, supra note 87, at 833, 851–52.  Farber argues that the best 
approach for guidance on how courts should approach judicial review during an 
emergency may be found in national security cases concerning free speech.  Id.  In 
those cases, the government is afforded some deference, but the courts do not abandon 
“normal constitutional tests.” Id. at 835.  Similarly, Parmet argues that “Jacobson 
helps to set the table.  It provides a vital reminder of the context which courts should 
review public health measures, especially – but not only – during emergencies.” 
Parmet, supra note 154, at 132–33. 
468 See, e.g., Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1176–78 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(applying the Jacobson framework but finding executive order postponing all non-
emergency medical procedures including abortion likely violates right to abortion). 
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their respective state supreme courts have stepped in to make sure neither 
the executive nor legislative branches have bypassed the statutory 
mechanisms set forth in their respective emergency statutes.469  The state 
supreme courts have universally abided by the process.470 
Both the judiciary and legislature provide a check on the governor’s 
power to issue executive orders.471  After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Roman Catholic Diocese, one could easily say that the judiciary has 
ventured from a check on the executive’s power to usurping some of that 
function. Roman Catholic Diocese does just that.472  The Court, armed 
with less information than the governor, chose to compare houses of 
worship capacity restrictions with those of liquor stores and acupuncture 
facilities, whereas Governor Cuomo backed by scientific experts, grouped 
houses of worship with secular institutions such as movie theaters, 
concerts, and sports arenas where large groups of people gather for long 
periods of time.473  By disregarding Governor Cuomo’s basis for grouping 
the institutions and substituting its own, the Court went beyond providing 
a check on executive authority; it decided in lieu of the executive.474  While 
there is no doubt that this is Madisonian checks and balances at play, I 
would argue that the judiciary should not interfere the way it did in Roman 
Catholic Diocese and defer to the governor more.475 As some legal 
scholars have suggested, some degree of deference should be given to the 
executive during times of emergency, but traditional constitutional 
analysis should not be abandoned.476 
In the United States, there is no judicial check on a governor’s failure 
to act during a state of emergency.477  A state’s emergency disaster statute 
may provide the governor with broad powers to act during these times, but 
it cannot require him to use those powers in a specific manner.478  Indeed, 
 
469 See supra Part III.B. 
470 Id. 
471 Id. 
472 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020). 
473 Id. at 80 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
474 Id. at 79–80. 
475 While the New York state legislature repealed the statute that granted 
Governor Cuomo additional powers during the COVID-19 pandemic, he still 
maintains the emergency powers he already had under the New York Executive Law 
and all his current executive orders remain in effect for the next sixty days. See S.B. 
5357, 2021-2022 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).   Moreover, the basis for the 
repeal had more to do with allegations of sexual harassment against Governor Cuomo 
and accusations that Cuomo’s aides manipulating the death count at nursing homes 
than with Cuomo’s issuance of executive orders. See Goodman & Hakim, supra note 
339. 
476 See Farber, supra note 87, at 834–35. 
477 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (establishing that neither 
Congress nor federal regulators have the authority to require state officials to act). 
478 Id. 
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the “choice to act or not to act lies with the [governor].”479  While a 
religious group may challenge an executive order limiting indoor 
gatherings, senior citizens cannot ask a court to order the governor to 
impose a mask mandate or orders its citizens to shelter in place as a means 
to keep them safe and healthy.480  The underlying premise for this 
dichotomy lies with the Constitution being a “charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties.”481  New York and Florida are two examples where 
the governor has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic differently.482  In 
New York, as discussed in supra Part IV.A, Governor Cuomo has taken 
an active approach toward curbing the virus issuing numerous executive 
orders including a recent one limiting indoor gatherings which was 
successfully challenged by religious groups before the United States 
Supreme Court.483  In contrast, Florida Governor DeSantis has not issued 
a mask mandate nor any recent social distancing restrictions and in fact 
has an order prohibiting any enforcement of local COVID-19 
restrictions.484  Unlike New York religious groups challenging Governor 
Cuomo’s mass gathering order, no Florida citizen or group can challenge 
Governor DeSantis’ failure to issue either a mask mandate or an order 
limiting mass gatherings.485  Certainly, the Florida Legislature can choose 
to enact legislation, but it cannot be required to do so.486  In non-emergency 
times Florida citizens, displeased with their elected officials’ actions or 
lack thereof, can simply vote them out of office.487  However, in times of 
emergency, citizens do not have the luxury to wait for an election.  With 
Governor DeSantis’ approval rating at 40% in October 2020, 8% below 
 
479 See Rossi, supra note 35, at 268; Eric Posner, You Can Sue to Stop 
Lockdowns, But You Can’t Sue to Get Them. That is Dangerous, WASH. POST (May 
4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/lockdown-legal-challenges-
constitution/2020/05/03/389af052-8aff-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/7LUU-67WA].  In this commentary, Posner argues that courts 
should largely stay out of emergency public health matters because the courts can only 
respond to challenges to enjoin enforcement of executive orders and not to challenges 
that government has failed to appropriately enact such orders. Id.  He says the result 
is “one-sided pressure on governors . . . .”  Id. 
480 Posner, supra note 479. Unlike Posner, I do not advocate that the judiciary 
stay out of public health emergency matters.  Id.  Thus far, most courts have come 
down on the side of the state.  Id.  Those holdings which find the executive orders 
likely enforceable certainly balance out the ones finding that they are not.  Id. 
481 See Stephen Heyman, First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509 (1991) (quoting Jackson v. City of 
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
482 See Opam, supra note 324; see also Finley, supra note 347. 
483 See supra Part IV.A. 
484 See supra Part IV.B. 
485 See Heyman, supra note 481. 
486 Id. 
487 Id. at 530. 
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the national average for governors and about 17% below the approval 
rating for Governor Cuomo, he may very well be voted out of office come 
the next election.488   
B. Lessons Learned Early On 
Governors can certainly learn from recent judicial decisions how best 
to craft an executive order to withstand a constitutional challenge.  For 
executive orders that seek to limit or prohibit non-essential mass 
gatherings, it is imperative that the order be neutral and generally 
applicable to better survive a challenge based on the Free Exercise 
Clause.489  If it is neutral and generally applicable, that order is subject to 
rational basis review. Otherwise, the order would be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny.490  That means the executive order should not “single” out 
religious organizations as the Kansas Governor did in one of her executive 
orders or the New York Governor in the most recent case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.491  Nor should the executive order be so riddled with 
exceptions to a mass gathering ban that it is no longer generally 
applicable.492  The executive order also must not leave it to the discretion 
of law enforcement to decide “whether a religious person or entity has met 
the ‘no-more-than-10-inside-unless-impossible’ requirement.”493  And 
finally, the governor will want to craft the executive order keeping in mind 
how such restrictions compare to similar secular gatherings.  Governors 
can also tailor their orders based on latest scientific advancements.  Recent 
scientific data points to COVID-19 transmitting easily in cafes, 
restaurants, gyms and reducing capacity in those venues to somewhere 
between 20–30% would significantly reduce infections.494  Indeed, the 
New Jersey and New York governors followed the science and capped 
 
488 See Lazer, supra note 343, at 8–10. 
489 See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 888 (1990). 
490 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694 (2014); see also 
Corbin, supra note 168, at 6. 
491 See First Baptist Church v. Kelly, 455 F.Supp.3d 1078, 1089–90 (D. Kan. 
2020) (analyzing an executive order limiting indoor religious services to no more than 
10 persons); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) 
(analyzing an executive order limiting indoor religious services in certain zones to 10 
or 25 persons). 
492 See Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2020). 
493 See Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660–61 (E.D.N.C. 
2020). 
494 David Cyranoski, How to Stop Restaurants from Driving COVID Infections, 
NATURE (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03140-4 
[https://perma.cc/6CNA-BLZT]. 
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indoor dining and gyms at 25%.495  This would allow governors to balance 
the economic interests of these businesses while also curbing transmission.   
Litigants also play a role by providing courts with evidence that the 
executive order does not relate to the requisite level of government 
interest.  Litigants provided such evidence to convince both the Eleventh 
and Sixth Circuits that their Governor’s executive order restricting or 
prohibiting elective medical procedures likely violated the constitutional 
right to abortion.496 In doing so, the litigants produced evidence that the 
state’s goal of reducing social interaction, freeing up hospital resources 
and conserving PPE were contradictory since banning or delaying 
abortions would result in ongoing pre-natal care which would actually 
increase hospital resources, PPE and social interactions. 497  And in Roman 
Catholic Diocese, plaintiffs provided evidence that it had complied with 
all COVID-19 mitigation measures and that neither the church nor the 
synagogue has had an outbreak since reopening.498  
C. Continued Need for Emergency Executive Orders and Greater 
Role for State Legislatures and State Agencies 
Most states have had active states of emergency for COVID-19 since 
March 2020 for more than a year.499  COVID-19 is not like other infectious 
diseases of the past that can be more easily contained with isolation and 
quarantine of just those infected or exposed.500  Asymptomatic infection 
contributes to spreading the disease unknowingly.501  COVID-19 does not 
rest, and neither should the governors in response.  As with most initial 
emergencies, most governors quickly responded to COVID-19 by issuing 
executive orders aimed at curbing transmission though the stay-at-home 
orders and limits on gatherings were unpopular and negatively impacted 
the economy.502  But, fast forward eight months later to November 2020, 
and the United States’ daily COVID-19 positivity rates, death rates and 
hospitalizations were at an all-time high.503 The emergency had not 
 
495 See N.J. Exec. Order No. 183, supra note 47; Interim Guidance For New 
York City Indoor Food Services During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, 
N.Y.S. DEP’T HEALTH (May 7, 2021), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/NYC_Indoor_Food_Serv
ices_Detailed_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQB7-P6N8]. 
496 Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020); Adams & 
Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 2020). 
497 Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1182; Slatery, 956 F.3d at 920. 
498 Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020). 
499 COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans, supra note 11. 
500 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 68–70. 
501 Slivka, supra note 72. 
502 See Cloud, supra note 127. 
503 Mzezewa & Calahan, supra note 140. 
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subsided; it had worsened.504  And governors began to respond albeit 
slowly to issuing more restrictive orders in order to slow down the spread 
of the virus.  New Mexico’s department of health issued a two-week stay 
at home order.505  By January 2021, with three thousand U.S. citizens 
dying every day from COVID-19, response needed to be swift.506 While 
opposition to these restrictions are significant, the majority of Americans 
supported many of their governor’s restrictive measures.507  Even more 
telling are the approval ratings, with hands-on approach governors (like 
New York and New Jersey) receiving much higher approval ratings than 
hands-off governors (like Florida).508   
In less emergent areas, more state legislatures and state agencies 
should enact COVID-19 related statutes or regulations rather than the 
governor issuing executive orders. Unlike an executive order which is 
issued quickly, a bill goes through a formal process.509 The time that it 
takes to pass a bill, even one that moves more quickly, allows for revision, 
reflection and amendment.510  For these reasons, certain COVID-19 
measures that will be necessary to implement for a longer period of time 
should be taken up by state legislatures, even those only in session for part 
of the year. 
For example, a requirement for citizens to wear face coverings in 
public should come out of the legislature via statute or alternatively the 
state health department via a regulation.  The science is clear that facial 
coverings protect both the wearer and those the wearer encounters.511  New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Minnesota had face mask bills introduced but so 
far none have passed.512  Passing these bills would essentially codify their 
respective Governor’s executive order mandating mask wearing in public.  
But even more, it would likely alter citizens’ perspective of the mask 
requirement since it would now come from the formal rule making body. 
New York provides a model for states with a full-time or a significant 
part-time legislature to follow as the New York State Legislature has 
enacted significant COVID-19 related legislation and the state health 
 
504 See Cloud, supra note 127. 
505 N.M. Pub. Health Order, supra note 142. 
506 Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XEV-49FH] (last visited May 1, 2021). 
507 Daniller, supra note 125. 
508 See Lazer, supra note 343. 
509 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 59–60. 
510 Id. at 60. 
511 See Scientific Brief, supra note 130. 
512 Carl Smith, Lawmakers Get Tough with Mask Requirements: Legislative 
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department has promulgated some emergency regulations concerning 
social distancing measures.513  For example, while Governor Cuomo 
initially issued executive orders providing a moratorium on utilities and 
evictions, those measures were taken up and passed by the state 
legislature.514  As bills, they were introduced, debated and passed by the 
Senate and Assembly.515  They were then signed by the New York 
Governor.516   
While under difficult circumstances, the Michigan legislature 
enacted bi-partisan legislation that had been previously covered by 
Governor Whitmer’s executive orders.517  And, it did so fairly quickly by 
passing six bills within three weeks after the Michigan Supreme Court said 
Governor Whitmer’s executive orders concerning COVID-19 were no 
longer valid.518   
Even state agencies can take a larger role by promulgating more 
formal regulations.  The Virginia emergency standard for workplace safety 
provides a prime example.519  That standard went through several 
iterations and provided for public comments.520  While not expedient, 
these workplace regulations are less likely to be modified and more likely 
to have stronger buy-in from employers and citizens alike.   
 
513 See, e.g., S.B. 08113, 2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. June 20, 
2020); S.B. 08427, 2019-2020, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. May 30, 2020). 
514 See, e.g., S.B. 08113A, 2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. June 20, 
2020) (concerning a moratorium on utility termination services during the pandemic); 
S.B. 08427, 2019-2020, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. May 30, 2020) (providing 
for employee death benefit for those contracting COVID-19 in the workplace). 
515 S.B. S8113A, 2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); S.B. S8427, 
2019-2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020). 
516 See S.B. S8113A, supra note 515; S.B. S8427, supra note 515. 
517 See, e.g., S.B. 1094, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); H.B. 6137, 100th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); S.B. 886, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2020). 
518 Derick Hutchinson, Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer Signs 6 COVID-19 
Bills Into Law, CLICK ON DETROIT (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.clickondetroit.com/health/2020/11/05/michigan-gov-gretchen-whitmer-
signs-6-covid-19-bills-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/GP6D-RPEH]. 
519 See VA. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD, INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE PREVENTION: SARS-COV-2 VIRUS THAT CAUSES COVID-19, 16VAC25-220 
(July 27, 2020), https://www.doli.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RIS-VR-
FINAL-COVID-19-Emergency-Temporary-Standard-FOR-PUBLIC-
DISTRIBUTION-final-July-23.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHE5-D4SV]. 
520 Virginia Safety and Health Codes Board Adoption of COVID-19 Emergency 
Temporary Standard/Emergency Regulation, DEP’T OF LAB. AND INDUSTRY, 
https://www.doli.virginia.gov/virginia-safety-and-health-codes-board-adoption-of-
covid-19-emergency-temporary-standard-emergency-regulation/ 
[https://perma.cc/L36S-B4BE] (last visited May 20, 2021). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
As we reflect on 2020, it is useful to consider how the majority of 
state governors used emergency executive orders during this ongoing 
crisis.  Governors needed to act quickly in order to curb the spread of 
COVID-19.  This often took the form of orders to limit gathering sizes, 
close certain non-essential businesses where there can be significant 
transmission such as bars and even close schools.521  Battling a highly 
contagious virus, a governor could not simply wait for the state legislature 
to pass an emergency statute.  It takes too long for a state health agency to 
go through the formal process of issuing an emergency regulation.  Neither 
the legislature nor the judiciary should be involved in the executive order 
process unless the governor oversteps her bounds.  Their role should be 
one of a “check” and not one of participation.  That check is easily met if 
the legislature can terminate a state of emergency by concurrent resolution 
and, as of March 2021, about thirty-three states had that authority.522 
Likewise, the courts should be there to properly balance the urgent need 
for the governor to curb transmission of the virus with potential 
constitutional violations.  It should not be there to substitute its decision 
for that of the governor. 
 
521 See Wiley, supra note 70, at 69–70. 
522 See infra Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A contains a chart of some key components of each state’s 
emergency disaster statute.523  The first column lists each state/U.S. 
territory alphabetically.  Column two lists the maximum duration of the 
emergency declaration if applicable.  Column three looks at who may 
extend the declaration of emergency if applicable.  Column four lists 













Alabama 60 Days Governor or N/A 
 
523 Included in this chart are the emergency disaster statutes for the District 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
524 The information collected in Appendix A for columns two, three and four 
were gathered by looking at the following statutes which were in effect as of 
December 31, 2020: ALA. CODE § 31-9-8 (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.040 (2020); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-303 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-75-107 (2020); CAL. 
GOV'T CODE §§ 8624, 8629 (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-704 (2020); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 28-9 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3115 (2020); D.C. CODE § 
7-2306 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 252.36 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (2020); 10 
GUAM CODE ANN. § 19405 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 127A-14 (2020); IDAHO CODE 
§ 46-1008 (2020); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/7 (2020); IND. CODE § 10-14-3-12 (2020); 
IOWA CODE § 29C.6 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39A.100 (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 37-B, § 
743 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-107 (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 30.403 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 12.31 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-15-11 (2021); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-505 (2019); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 81-829.40 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 414.070 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 4:45 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-3 (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-5 
(2020); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.20 
(2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 683.9 (2020); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 401.192 (2020); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301(C) 
(West 2020); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 1942 (2021); 30 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15-9 
(2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-440 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-48A-5 (2020); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-107 (2020); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.014 (West 2019); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2A-206 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 9 (2020); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 44-146.17 (2020); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1005 (2020); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 43.06.220 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 323.10 (2019); 
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STATE/U.S. 
TERRITORY 








Alaska 30 Days Legislature   Yes 
Arizona  N/A N/A Yes 
Arkansas 60 Days N/A Yes  
California  N/A N/A Yes 
Colorado  30 days N/A Yes 
Connecticut N/A N/A Yes 






Florida  60 days Governor Yes  
Georgia 30 days N/A Yes 
Guam  30 days N/A Yes 
Hawaii 60 days N/A N/A 
Idaho 30 Days N/A Yes 
Illinois 30 days N/A N/A 
Indiana 30 days N/A Yes 
Iowa 30 days N/A Yes 
Kansas 15 days Legislature  N/A 
Kentucky N/A N/A N/A 
Louisiana 30 days N/A Yes 
Maine 30 days N/A Yes 
Maryland  30 days N/A Yes 
Massachusetts  N/A N/A N/A 
Michigan   28 days Legislature N/A 
Minnesota  
 
5 days Executive 
Council may 
extend to 30 
days. 
Yes 
Mississippi 30 days Governor  N/A 
Missouri N/A N/A Yes 
Montana 45 days N/A N/A 
Nebraska N/A N/A Yes 
Nevada N/A N/A Yes 
New 
Hampshire 
21 days N/A Yes 
New Jersey 30 days N/A N/A 
New Mexico  30 days N/A No, by governor 
New York 6 Months Governor  Yes 
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STATE/U.S. 
TERRITORY 










N/A N/A Yes, if Legislature is the 
authority that declared 
emergency. 
North Dakota N/A N/A Yes 
Ohio N/A N/A N/A 
Oklahoma 
 
N/A Public Health 
Emergency must 
be approved by 
State Legislature 
in special session. 
Yes 
Oregon N/A N/A Yes 
Pennsylvania  90 days N/A Yes 
Puerto Rico  
 
N/A N/A Legislature shall pass 
judgment on the content 
of emergency order. 
Rhode Island 30 days N/A Yes 
South Carolina  15 days General 
Assembly  
N/A 
South Dakota 6 months N/A Yes 
Tennessee 30 days N/A N/A 
Texas 30 days N/A Yes 
Utah 30 days N/A Yes 
Vermont N/A N/A N/A 








Washington 30 days Legislature N/A 
West Virginia 30 days N/A Yes 
Wisconsin 60 Days Legislature Yes 
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